STUDIES

IN INTELLIGENCE | Vol. 67, No. 2 (June 2023)









Becoming A Learning Organization
Intelligence and Congress
An Enduring Debate
Commentary and Response

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ISSN 1527-0874

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- Articles from 1992 to the present can be found at
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- More than 200 articles released as a result of a FOIA request in 2014 can be found at "Declassified Articles from Studies in Intelligence: The IC?s Journal for the Intelligence Professional" | CIA FOIA (foia.cia.gov)
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Mission The mission of *Studies in Intelligence* is to stimulate within the Intelligence Community the constructive discussion of important issues of the day, to expand knowledge of lessons learned from past experiences, to increase understanding of the history of the profession, and to provide readers with considered reviews of public media concerning intelligence.

The journal is administered by the Center for the Study of Intelligence, which includes the CIA's History Staff, Lessons Learned and Emerging Trends Programs, and the CIA Museum.

Contact *Studies in Intelligence* welcomes articles, book reviews, and other communications. Hardcopy material or data discs (preferably in .doc or .rtf formats) may be mailed to:

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The Sherman Kent Award of $3,500 is offered annually for the most significant contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in *Studies*. The prize may be divided if two or more articles are judged to be of equal merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding.

Another monetary award is given in the name of Walter L. Pforzheimer to the graduate or undergraduate student who has written the best article on an intelligence-related subject.

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EDITORIAL POLICY

Articles for *Studies in Intelligence* may be written on any historical, operational, doctrinal, or theoretical aspect of intelligence.

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The criterion for publication is whether, in the opinion of the board, the article makes a contribution to the literature of intelligence. Board members are all active or former Intelligence Community officers.

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Studies in Intelligence

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Contributors

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Reflections on the Study of Intelligence

Peter S. Usowski, Ph.D.

Today*, Studies in Intelligence *and the scholarly research programs in CSI have paramount roles in sustaining and growing the fund of knowledge on the intelligence business. CIA senior leadership's attention to and support for these enterprises have had a direct impact on the agency's successful attempts to study intelligence.

Within a few years of the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, its leaders recognized that to advance intelligence tradecraft the agency needed an organized and accessible repository of knowledge. During those early years, the sources for knowledge on all aspects of the intelligence business not only were in records dispersed throughout CIA buildings but also largely rested in the heads of CIA's active and former practitioners. A body of literature devoted to the intelligence profession did not exist. With the creation of a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) historical staff in 1951, the publication of the journal *Studies in Intelligence* in 1955, and the establishment of the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) in 1974, CIA's leaders set out on a path, rocky at times, to conscientiously devote resources to studying intelligence and building up a fund of knowledge.

Today, *Studies in Intelligence* and the scholarly research programs in CSI have paramount roles in sustaining and growing the fund of knowledge on the intelligence business. CIA senior leadership's attention to and support for these enterprises have had a direct impact on the agency's successful attempts to study intelligence. Throughout the agency's history, the resources and talent that its leaders have been willing to devote to capture and share knowledge have fluctuated for a variety of reasons. Yet, from the modest beginnings of the 1950s to the capabilities that exist today, there has always been a commitment to the study of intelligence. CIA's efforts have evolved and improved over the years as scholars and practitioners introduced innovative approaches and increasingly more sophisticated methods for studying intelligence and making the knowledge available to the workforce and leadership.

The study of intelligence as an official function is distinct from the type of research and writing university professors, students, and other outside scholars pursue. At CIA, this work is not carried out as an academic undertaking but rather as a means of directly contributing to the improvement of the agency's mission performance. This article traces the evolution of the efforts in CIA to study intelligence and build a useful and readily available body of knowledge. CIA has throughout its history supported a number of formal internal training schools going back as far as the early years of the Office of Policy Coordination and the Office of Special Operations. These institutions have served the agency workforce well in supporting its professional development. The courses taught at these schools have readily drawn upon the aforementioned fund of knowledge. The focus of this paper, however, is on the actual capturing, analyzing, and sharing of

The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government. © Peter S. Usowski, 2023

World War II intelligence officer, lawyer, and investment banker William Harding Jackson served as deputy (October 1950–August 1951) under DCI Bedell Smith. Jackson was tasked with improving the professionalism of CIA and urged the agency to document its history. (Photo: Wikimedia)

knowledge that goes on outside the schoolhouses.

To expound on the essence of the study of intelligence at CIA, this article addresses the following questions: 1) Why has CIA devoted resources to this effort? 2) What aspects of intelligence have been the focus of study? 3) When in CIA's history did these pursuits take place? 4) Where in CIA has this work been performed? 5) Who has been engaged in the research, analysis, and writing on the intelligence business? and 6) How have CIA and IC professionals approached the study of intelligence?

The DCI History Staff

The foundation for the study of intelligence was set with a focus on current CIA history. DDCI Jackson in December 1950 recommended that the research and writing of CIA's current history be undertaken by a staff within the agency. Jackson wanted histories that were prepared on a current basis to familiarize future directors with the CIA's evolution.[1] Five months later, in May 1951, the DCI History Staff was created. The staff was led by the assistant to the director; its function was to produce a CIA history that covered the legislative background, the original organizational structure, and subsequent reorganizations.[2] Jackson wanted the first history to be an audit of the evolution of the concept of the "national intelligence system" that would be shared with members of the National Security Council (NSC) so they could benefit from the lessons of the agency's successes and "avoid repeating its failures."[3] Furthermore, DCI Walter Bedell Smith wanted a "dispassionate chronological type of history."[4]

The head of the History Staff hired an academic historian, Arthur B. Darling from Yale University to research and write the first in-house history. CIA leaders wanted an objective narrative of the agency's first three years, with a look at the reforms put in place to create a centralized intelligence establishment.[5] Darling drew on original source documents and interviewed individuals who played key roles in the establishment and development of the agency during those early years.[6]

Instead of a dispassionate history, Darling's work, *The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government to 1950,* turned out to be an account of the bureaucratic battles waged by the early DCIs, with criticism directed against many of the officials involved. Allen Dulles succeeded Smith as the DCI by the time the history was completed. Instead of making it available to a broad readership, Dulles limited access.[7] Darling returned to academic life; the History

In early 1980, when the CIA history program was on the verge of being abolished, DCI Stansfield Turner set up a history advisory committee to review the past and present state of the history program and offer recommendations on the proper role and scope of the effort.

staff leadership also changed with the transition to the Dulles era.[a,8]

This ever-shifting environment was typical of the History Staff's next 50 years. The size, professional makeup, mission, output, and organizational alignment varied during those five decades. As the staff and CIA leadership navigated their way during this vacillating evolution, a number of prominent voices weighed in on the History Staff's roles. On April 29, 1966, Sherman Kent offered his own recommendations in a memo to the DCI titled "The Agency and the Business of Its History."

At the time, Kent was the longtime chairman of the Board of National Estimates and a highly influential IC leader and scholar. With a doctorate in history, he was a professor at Yale University until joining the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and CIA. Kent argued that CIA's History Staff should be led by a professional historian who would report to the director, deputy director, or executive director.[9] The rest of the staff could be recruited from among the talented officers within CIA. According to Kent, the staff should have two responsibilities: "the writing of finished history, that is, the reconstruction of the past of the Agency, and ordering of the day-by-day accumulation of the staff of archives from which tomorrow's finished history must be written."[10] The archives should include not just memos and documents but the testimonies of key actors.

Kent emphasized the importance of accurately capturing what happened not just for the purpose of maintaining an "official memory for its own sake, but for effective offensives and rear-guard actions in the great bureaucratic war within the Federal Government."[11] Kent's persuasive note served to keep senior leaders' attention on the importance of history and thwart any erosion in such activities. However, no immediate action was taken in response to Kent's recommendations.

A year later, CIA's executive director asked retired university history professor Howard Ehrmann to offer thoughts on the history program.[12] Ehrmann proposed that in addition to the production of histories on agency activities, specific directorate histories should be written. He recommended that the directorate histories be done by historical writers from throughout the agency. DCI Richard Helms approved Ehrmann's approach and in 1969 hired him to implement the plan.[13]

Ehrmann's concept built upon an existing Directorate of Plans effort called the Clandestine Services Historical Program (CSHP). The objective of the CSHP was to record the first 20 years of the Clandestine Service history.[14] The CSHP produced more than 500 papers and monographs, which included histories of overseas stations.[15] Because the directorate historical writers were not trained historians and did not work directly with the History Staff historians, the quality of their products varied.[16] Furthermore, because of the sensitive nature of many of these histories, access was limited on a strict need-to-know basis. Thus, during that time, they were of little value to CIA's workforce. By 1973, DCI William Colby ended the directorate history program and scaled back the overall CIA effort.[17] Under Ehrmann, the History Staff had expanded to 10 permanent positions, in addition to the numerous directorate history writers, but by 1975, the staff comprised only a historian and a secretary.

In early 1980, when the CIA history program was on the verge of being abolished, DCI Stansfield Turner set up a history advisory committee to review the past and present state of the history program and offer recommendations on the proper role and scope of the effort.[18] To assist in their work, the committee sought the advice of historian Dr. Martin Blumenson, who prepared a report for the committee.[19] Blumenson's fundamental premise was that a historical activity is useful to the organization. Such an activity was not a luxury but rather an important function that could support and facilitate the agency's work. He argued that "a competent Historical Activity, if properly supported, directed, and managed can and should contribute to the Agency's missions, roles, and functions."[20] His bottom line was that the agency's history activity needed to be strengthened: "Such an Activity will, above all, serve the Agency by

a. Darling's history would resurface in 1964, when the first of six classified excerpts appeared in *Studies in Intelligence*; the remaining five appeared in separate issues into 1969. All six would be declassified in 1993. See endnote 8 for source citations.

Copies of the first three editions of *Studies in Intelligence*, brainchild of the legendary Sherman Kent. *Studies* has been in continuous publication since 1955. (CIA photo)

providing an institutional memory for internal use, being a point of contact with other governmental agencies and departments, and eventually enhancing the stature of the Agency in the public awareness."[21] The advisory committee drew heavily on Blumenson's general and specific recommendations in its report to the DCI.

While the committee was able to stop the erosion of the CIA's history activities, over the next decade the History Staff did not reach the potential laid out by Blumenson and the committee. Organizationally, the staff had many homes during its first 40 years; in January 1991 it moved into CSI.[22]

Regardless of organizational alignment, CIA historians have followed the same disciplined and learned practices as those of their professional colleagues in the academic world. The essence of the historians' work is the discovery, interpretation, and presentation of information about the past. When appropriate, they have adhered to the "Standards of Professional Conduct" maintained by the American Historical Association in order to gain trust and confidence in their work.

The body of historical works produced by CIA historians included monographs and books covering intelligence analysis, foreign intelligence collection, counterintelligence, intelligence support to national security policymaking, and organizational developments. Furthermore, the historians not only provided briefings and lectures at internal training courses but also regularly responded to inquiries from senior leaders and the Office of Public Affairs on aspects of CIA history.[23]

Studies in Intelligence

In September 1955, Director of Training Matthew Baird introduced the CIA workforce to a new internal, classified journal called *Studies in Intelligence*. In his introductory note to the first issue, he explained, "I believe that the production of these *Studies* will be a step in the direction of creating a literature of basic doctrine and methodology useful both to the training activity and to

the Agency as a whole. In sponsoring this endeavor, I therefore urge your active participation and support so that we may all benefit in advancing the profession of intelligence by this means."[24]

The idea for this journal first surfaced almost two years before, when in December 1953, Sherman Kent submitted a memo to the director of training recommending the establishment of an "Institute for Advanced Study of Intelligence." As part of his overall thinking on this matter, Kent also proposed the establishment of a journal devoted to "intelligence theory and doctrine, and the techniques of the discipline."[25] Other than pointing out that journal articles could be classified or unclassified, he did not, in that memo, further elaborate on his vision and reason for the journal.

The idea of establishing an institute for studying intelligence did not immediately generate much interest among CIA leaders, but in 1954 Kent was asked to expound on his proposal for a journal. Before a CIA gathering, he presented his case for the publication.[26] This presentation would turn out to be the essence of an article that appeared in the first issue of *Studies*, titled "The Need for an Intelligence Literature."

Beginning with the premise that intelligence had become a recognized professional discipline with a developed theory and doctrine, Kent pointed out that the intelligence profession lacked a body of literature, a written fund of knowledge, that could be passed on to current and future practitioners. He explained that this body of literature should be produced by intelligence professionals. They would be creating what he called, "the institutional mind and memory of our discipline" that would become "the permanent recording of our new ideas and experiences."[27]

The body of literature that Kent sought to create would focus on the method and practice of the intelligence mission. This would be the starting point for what would be an "elevated debate" among practitioners.

Fostering an Elevated Debate

The body of literature that Kent sought to create would focus on the method and practice of the intelligence mission. This would be the starting point for what would be an "elevated debate" among practitioners.[28] He understood that given the nature of the topics, the contributions to the journal would have to be classified. In 2001, the phrase "Journal of the American Intelligence Professional" was added to the cover of *Studies*. That phrase clearly reflects what Kent had in mind when he submitted his proposal.

Studies in Intelligence had an unassuming beginning. The first issue only contained two entries: Kent's article and a piece by the editors that reinforced Kent's arguments and laid out the charter, process, structure, and focus of the journal. The next two issues, published in January 1956 and May 1956, clearly showed that the journal would contain articles written by intelligence professionals for intelligence professionals. Each of the two issues comprised two articles with common themes. The focus of the January issue was on foreign capabilities and national intelligence; the May issue was devoted to economic intelligence.

It was not until more than a year later that *Studies* emerged as what one typically sees in a professional journal. The fall 1957 issue was assigned a bibliographic reference point—Vol. 1, No. 4. It included a table of contents with a listing of 13 entries covering various aspects of intelligence. From that point on, *Studies* would be a quarterly journal. In the foreword, DCI Allen Dulles reinforced the fundamental purpose of the journal: "The *Studies in Intelligence* series provides such a medium for doctrinal expression in the profession of intelligence. . . . The *Studies* are designed to bridge the gap between experience and inexperience, between theory and practice, and to provide for professional growth."[29]

Introducing the Editorial Board

That issue also introduced the *Studies* Editorial Board and spelled out editorial policy. As stated up front: "The final responsibility for accepting or rejecting an article rests with the Editorial Board. The criterion for publication is whether or not, in the opinion of the Board, the article makes a contribution to the literature of intelligence."[30] This statement asserted the independence of the board. Neither the DCI nor any CIA senior leader alone would determine what to publish or not to publish. This editorial policy has remained in place throughout the life of *Studies*.

Kent served as the first chair of the Editorial Board and remained in that role until his retirement in 1968. During the early years, the board's composition was small, normally four or five members in addition to the chair. Board members came from the ranks of CIA leadership.

In 1992, however, as part of a movement in CIA to achieve greater transparency with the public, the* Studies *board agreed to publish a separate issue containing the unclassified articles that appeared in the four classified issues for that year or earlier.

The fall 1957 issue also specified who could submit articles for consideration by the editorial board: "Contributions to the *Studies* may come from any member of the Intelligence Community or, upon invitation, from persons outside the Intelligence Community."[31] Even though *Studies* was launched, managed, and supported by CIA, it was clear from the beginning that it was intended to be open to contributors from all of the IC.

During the early years, contributors came from outside of CIA, but CIA officers wrote most of the articles.[32] To accommodate a full discussion of doctrine, tradecraft, and a broad array of intelligence experiences, *Studies* was published as a classified journal. Yet even with the classification restrictions, Kent sought the broadest dissemination of the journal, in stark contrast to the tightly controlled access that DCI Dulles placed on the first publication of the History Staff.

Upon his retirement and departure from the board in 1968, Kent offered his own assessment of how well the journal had, up until then, met the goals he had in mind: "That *Studies* has in fact contributed to a richer understanding of the bones and viscera of the intelligence calling is beyond argument."[33] Acknowledging the journal's slow beginning, he noted that during the second half of his tenure as chair, the number and quality of the articles increased significantly.[34] Kent noted that the journal included articles on intelligence history, theory and doctrine, and methods. Furthermore, he was pleased to see that contributors came from a wide spectrum of CIA components and from intelligence officers outside of CIA.[35] Yet he would have liked to have seen a greater number of intelligence offers sharing their knowledge and insights.

Kent found the response from readers of *Studies* was very positive, and it came from all quarters of the IC.[36] On the negative side, Kent acknowledged that, given the nature of the topics covered in *Studies*, it was going to be a challenge to provide practitioners a journal they could take home and read. All editions of the journal during his tenure were classified. This meant that taking time to read *Studies* at work would always compete with the time devoted to mission. This would be a perennial challenge throughout the history of *Studies*.

Expanding Public Access

For its first 37 years, *Studies* was published quarterly as a classified journal, available only to those inside CIA and other elements of the intelligence and military communities. Despite the fact that some articles in the journal were unclassified, copies of the entire journal could not be taken home and were beyond the public's reach. In 1992, however, as part of a movement in CIA to achieve greater transparency with the public, the *Studies* board agreed to publish a separate issue containing the unclassified articles that appeared in the classified issues for that year or earlier. Several years after the publication of the inaugural unclassified issue, CIA released a set of originally unclassified or declassified articles, some of which would be published in *Inside CIA's Private World* (1995), edited by Yale Professor H. Bradford Westerfield.[37] His selection would only be a small sampling of the more than1400 articles from *Studies* CIA delivered to the National Archives and Records Administration in 1997, which today are retrievable from the NARA website.

The practice of publishing unclassified issues that began in 1992 continued, with variations in periodicity, until 2007. At that point, the *Studies* board agreed to publish separately unclassified extracts from each quarterly classified issue instead of releasing one or two compilations of extracts per year. This practice continues today.

With the efforts to generate accessible unclassified material, the *Studies* board had broadened its original targeted readership—intelligence practitioners and their partners and collaborators—to the public, including the population of users of the internet. (See facing page.) The intent of this expansion was to increase the public's understanding of the intelligence profession and dispel the many myths that had taken root about CIA and the IC. These changes would open the door for an increase in contributions from those from academia and private research institutions.

In 2005, in celebration of *Studies*' 50th anniversary, Nicholas Dujmovic, a CIA historian and then *Studies* board member, reviewed and assessed the five decades of the journal. He found that the journal remained

The Advent of CIA and CSI Presence on the Internet

The editorial board's intent to make more of *Studies'* material available to the public was not a simple matter in 1992, coming, as it did, before the full force of the internet was felt. When the first unclassified issue of *Studies* was published in that year, potential readers would either have had copies sent to them personally or would have had to purchase them through unclassified publication programs involving the Department of Commerce (National Technical Information Service) and the Library of Congress, which CIA had used for unclassified distribution of material since the 1950s.

It was not until October 1996, when CIA's first website appeared as www.odci.gov, that unclassified CIA and CSI products would appear on the web. The majority of the content listed then were the titles of printed products—along with instructions on how they could be obtained from Commerce or the Library of Congress and their cost. If one preferred to acquire hard copies of *Studies*, they were available for $27 each in 1996.

Buried in that first site was a home page for the Center for the Study of Intelligence (below). In it were posted two issues of unclassified *Studies* (1995 and 1996—31 articles), two declassified document collections, the first edition of what would become known as *Getting to Know the President* (four editions would be published through 2021), and two monographs.

The CIA website would evolve along with the internet, eventually becoming cia.gov. As it did, CSI's contribution to the site would grow exponentially, consuming a larger and larger share of the site's content. Today, cia.gov contains every unclassified issue published since 1992 (more than 1,000) as well as hundreds of older, archived articles and some 60 CSI-published books and monographs.



CENTER for the STUDY of INTELLIGENCE

The Center for the Study of Intelligence supports research and publishing on the intelligence profession and its various disciplines and declassifies historical records related to US intelligence operations during the Cold War. Center Fellows write on theoretical, practical, and historical intelligence issues. Members of the Center's History Staff write histories of the CIA and publish collections of declassified dicuments. The Center promotes exchanges with academic institutions and scholars through conferences and seminars and by arranging guest speakers and sponsoring CIA Officers-in-Residence at several universities. Monograph and videos prepared under Center auspices are available from the National Technical Information Service. Declassified Cold War Records are available at the National Archives. "Studies in Intelligence", a compilation of intelligence-related articles, is published each quarter in a classified version and yearly in an unclassified version. The Center welcomes inquiries from intelligence professionals and scholars about its programs and publications.

What's New at CSI . . .

CSI publications currently available:

- Studies in Intelligence
- Newsletters
- Books
- Monographs

Items of Interest:

- CIA Support for Foreign Relations of the United States
- CIA Exhibit Center

Updated: March 31, 1997

true to Kent's original intent in providing an outlet for sharing practical insights on the intelligence profession. Contributors ranged from senior leaders to subject-matter experts across a broad range of disciplines. Dujmovic concluded: "After 50 years, *Studies* is still accomplishing its mission of accumulating the 'best thinking' of intelligence thinkers and practitioners. That mission has remained unchanged. As Sherman Kent remarked during *Studies'* 25th anniversary year, 'The game still swings on the educated and thoughtful' intelligence officer."[38]

More Than Just CIA

Throughout the journal's life, CIA has funded and managed *Studies*. This has led to a perception that it is CIA's "in-house journal," a phrase commonly seen or heard in media mentions of the journal. From the beginning, *Studies* was intended to be the journal for the "American Intelligence Professional," not just for the CIA intelligence officer. A former director of national intelligence (DNI) and former Editorial Board member, Gen. James Clapper regarded *Studies* as the premier publication of its kind. To reinforce the fact that it was an IC journal, he suggested placement of the IC seal on the cover. Starting in 2011, all issues have the IC seal and the seals of all IC agencies on the back cover. (See next page.)

As a further reflection of *Studies* as an IC journal, the board membership evolved over time to regularly include representatives of other IC agencies, not just from CIA. Currently, the board is chaired by the director of CSI, and it includes members from CIA, the National Intelligence University, the ODNI, DIA, NSA, NGA, and

the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The current and former intelligence officers who make up the board have wide experience and expertise.

Since its inception, one of the core principles of the journal is that it is an independent, unofficial product of the *Studies* Editorial Board and its authors. Each article carries a disclaimer that the views expressed in each article are those of the authors and not those of CIA or any US government entity. In other words, *Studies* is not the official mouthpiece of CIA or any IC agency. *Studies* is not a "peer-reviewed" journal, as is commonplace in the academic world, but the rigor with which board members review, discuss, and debate each submission—often after consultation with experts in their domains—has ensured that the highest standards of scholarship are upheld and that each published article makes a significant contribution to the literature on intelligence.



Consistent with former DNI Clapper's request, the back cover of *Studies* features the ODNI seal surrounded by the seals of the other 17 organizations that comprise today's IC. The green field indicates that the edition is unclassified.

A review of the articles in the 84 issues of *Studies* published between 2002 and 2022 reveals that the journal covered the full scope of the intelligence profession and its heritage: history; leadership and management; analysis; operations; the intelligence-policy relationship; military intelligence; broader IC issues; and the future of the intelligence business. History and analysis made up the greatest share of the articles. A longstanding challenge has been getting operations officers to share their experiences and offer insights on the tradecraft associated with the clandestine services.

Over the past decade, 217 different authors contributed articles. As has been the case throughout *Studies'* existence, a majority of articles were written by CIA authors, making up almost 60 percent of the total. Another 23 percent came from other parts of the IC. The remaining 17 percent were written by authors from outside the IC. *Studies* has also published interviews with former IC senior leaders. In an effort to further advance the sharing of knowledge and experience across the IC, the *Studies* board in 2016 and 2018 sponsored IC-wide conferences covering the challenging topics of data-driven intelligence and strategic warning. Classified issues of *Studies* are made available to the greater IC workforce in both hard copy and electronic formats.

For the practitioners, the challenge today remains what it was in 1955—finding time in a busy schedule to spend with the rich content available in *Studies*. In doing so, the results can be rewarding. Former board member and senior CIA Directorate of Operations leader Frank Archibald once commented during a board meeting, "I have been a regular *Studies* reader from the time I entered on duty. Because I knew that when

I opened an issue of *Studies* I was going to find something in there that would help me do my job better."

The idea for the "Institute for Advanced Study of Intelligence" that Sherman Kent recommended in 1953 would finally become a reality 21 years later with the establishment of the Center for the Study of Intelligence.

Creating the Center for the Study of Intelligence

The idea for the "Institute for Advanced Study of Intelligence" that Sherman Kent recommended in 1953 would finally become a reality 21 years later with the establishment of the Center for the Study of Intelligence. At an April 1973 meeting of the CIA's Management Committee, DCI James Schlesinger said that there was a need for an intellectual atmosphere in which the intelligence process could be viewed from every perspective by the best minds in CIA and the IC. He commented that "there is more thinking and discussion on the intelligence process outside than inside CIA" and wanted that imbalance corrected.[39] The lack of "an intellectual forum and an intellectual fermentation at an appropriate level of concern for the intelligence process" was discussed at the April meeting.[40]

A year later, a plan for such a component in CIA that would support research on the intelligence process and host programs to stimulate thinking on the fundamental issues of the intelligence profession took shape. A Headquarters Notice on July 22, 1974, informed the workforce of the establishment of CSI: "The principal mission of the center will be to foster rigorous and systematic inquiry into the purposes and processes of intelligence."[41] CSI would host a permanent staff from the Office of Training. Others from the CIA workforce would be invited to participate and contribute to CSI-sponsored discussions.[42]

The director of CSI prepared an initial workplan of research and discussion topics and a seminar schedule for the new center. The deputy director for administration weighed in on the specific proposed topics and noted that some made "a lot of sense" but others might be "items we would put to the bottom of the list for a rainy day."[43] CSI enjoyed some early success in both the quality and relevance of its papers and seminars and the caliber of individuals interested in serving as intelligence fellows at CSI.

Falkiewicz Report

By early 1977, however, the center had begun to languish on both fronts—identifying suitable topics and attracting qualified people to serve as intelligence fellows. Thus in August 1977, the acting deputy director of CIA asked the director of the Office of Public Affairs, Andrew Falkiewicz, to review the situation at CSI and prepare a report of his findings.[44]

The Falkiewicz report reinforced the need for and value of the center, pointing out that there was wide support in CIA: "The rationale for the existence of CSI is as valid today as it was when the Center was established three years ago."[45] Falkiewicz listed the completed intelligence monographs and seminar reports and concluded that the intent in establishing CSI, up to then, had been fulfilled. He stressed that CSI's work was relevant to real-life issues in CIA and that the center was not an "ivory tower" focusing on abstract issues and matters disconnected from the workforce. CSI protected its independence so it could provide a venue for free inquiry and an objective look at the intelligence business. But Falkiewicz noted that agency managers were less involved in CSI matters: "Agency-wide perception of a management stake in the Center has been almost completely eroded."[46]

Falkiewicz's recommendations addressed this tension between CSI's independence and senior management involvement. Recognizing the importance of free inquiry, the report nevertheless asserted that CSI and management must meet halfway. Falkiewicz recommended that the "DCI should give urgent consideration to regularly using resources of the CSI for the study of topics of particular relevance to the development of overall Agency policy. . . . By using the resources of CSI in the policy-making process, Agency management would strengthen its stake in the Center without endangering the basic concepts of independence and freedom of inquiry."[47] The basic idea was to ensure that CSI was focusing its efforts on the areas of highest concern to CIA management as they related to the intelligence profession.

The report also included a recommendation to align CSI and *Studies in Intelligence* more closely, starting with unified leadership "headed by one director, with the title of Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, in cooperation with a Board of Advisors based on the editorial board of *Studies* as currently

In another step to consolidate the CIA's scholarly research and writing, DDCIA Richard Kerr, in January 1991, transferred the DCI History Staff to CSI.

constituted."[48] While both elements would retain their independence and respective missions, both should look to collaborate for "mutual benefit." The report concluded with a reference to the importance of staffing CSI appropriately in order to send a strong message to the workforce on the stature of the center and the importance of its work.[49]

DCI Turner Weighs In

In response to the Falkiewicz report, DCI Stansfield Turner, in a memo to the deputy director for administration, spelled out his support for CSI and emphasized that the agency needed a capability for "looking objectively at ourselves and our performance."[50] Turner wanted CSI to be closely linked to CIA's decision-making process. He admitted he was unfamiliar with the work being done at CSI and suggested a number of ways in which he could stay informed on what was going on and how he could better interact with the staff. In order to encourage talented officers to work in CSI, he agreed to issue a call to the workforce to serve on short-term assignment to the center as DCI Fellows. Furthermore, he endorsed the recommendation to have CSI manage *Studies in Intelligence*.[51]

In approving changes for CSI, Turner believed the center would provide "a unique forum for selected professionals from the agency and other IC components to make substantive contributions to the study and development of long-range issues of doctrine and policy."[52] Accordingly, Turner approved a new charter for CSI. Under this charter, in addition to the study of doctrine and policy that Turner emphasized, CSI was to document the institutional memory of the intelligence professionals, provide a forum for informed dissent, and support professional development opportunities through research, reflection, and articulation of ideas.[53]

Persistent Staffing Struggles

Despite Turner's strong support, CSI struggled over the next several years to attract talented professionals to the program. In September 1981, DDCI Bobby Inman urged CIA management to provide the support needed to enable CSI to reach the potential originally envisioned when it was established. He gave it one more chance to deliver.[54]

Five months later, Inman approved a new charter that emphasized CSI as a CIA and IC body for "developing a theory of intelligence, for stimulating the growth of a body of intelligence literature, for providing the means to research professional issues, and for providing senior management with innovative, topically directed studies that contribute to problem solving, policy development, and effective resource allocation."[55]

The charter listed specific CSI programs, its internal organizational structure, and its leadership. While the appropriate organizational alignment of CSI would continue to be debated in the following years, the question of whether or not CSI should continue to exist would not resurface.

In another step to consolidate the CIA's scholarly research and writing, DDCI Richard Kerr in January 1991 transferred the DCI History Staff to CSI. In a note to the workforce announcing this change, Kerr reaffirmed the mission of the History Staff "to help preserve the Agency's historical records and institutional memory, to provide a specialized reference service, and to research and write the history of the Agency."[56] He also pointed out that even with the organizational change, the History Staff would still be responsible to the DCI and DDCI for carrying out CIA's history program.

Historical Review Group

A year later, CSI would take on responsibility for managing another key agency document-related program. As part of an organizational move that put CSI under the Office of the Executive Director, the Historical Review Group (HRG) was established in the center. This new group took on the responsibility of the Historical Review Program that had been part of the Office of Information Technology. The HRG was responsible for the review and declassification of documents 30 years old.[57] The establishment of the HRG in CSI would affect the History Staff's work up to that point.

Instead of carrying out original historical research and publishing classified histories for the CIA workforce, the history staff partly diverted its attention to compiling and publishing collections of declassified documents for release to the public. As a whole, CSI shifted its efforts to the publication of such collections and sponsoring of conferences that highlighted the release of the thematically compiled documents.[58] This change in focus lasted until 1998, when the HRG transferred to the Office of Information Management,

thereby consolidating all declassification functions.

With the transfer of the HRG, CSI and the History Staff returned to a more focused effort on publishing classified studies of interest to current intelligence practitioners. Without the pressure of the HRG mission, CSI was also better positioned to fully take advantage of an initiative beginning in 1996 to interview intelligence officers. As part of its mission of documenting the agency's past, the history staff employed a regular practice of capturing the first-hand experiences of CIA employees through oral interviews. This capability in the years ahead would be an important element in the growth of CSI's knowledge fund.

Intelligence and Policy

In 2000, with the intent of providing intelligence officers greater insight into how policy officials use intelligence, CSI launched its Intelligence and Policy Project. Instead of only capturing the experiences of intelligence practitioners, this oral history interview project gathered input from former senior policymakers of administrations that had just left office. The objective of this series was to help CIA and other IC professionals better understand the types of intelligence senior policymakers use and value, or conversely, found unhelpful. This intelligence policy research would remain an important feature of CSI's ongoing work.

DCIA Michael Hayden in December 2006 charged CSI with overseeing CIA's Lessons Learned Program. (CIA photo)

Lessons Learned Program

Six years later, DCIA Michael Hayden further broadened CSI's mission. At the December 2006 *Studies in Intelligence* annual awards ceremony he announced, "I've asked CSI to serve as our Agency's center for lessons learned. This will help ensure that CIA is a true learning organization, one where significant experiences and knowledge are captured, preserved, and shared appropriately with those who can benefit from them. It is critical that we pass along to our thousands of new officers the accumulated wisdom and decades of experience that have made CIA the world's premier intelligence service."[59]

During its first 30 years, CSI had produced a number of studies that included lessons and best practices. The establishment of a formal lessons-learned program, however, was a major turning point in how CIA approached the study of intelligence. The key to CSI's Lessons Learned program has been its methods of collecting ethnographic data, which are collected at the source. Team observation during an activity, event, or operation being studied is preferred where possible. In the absence of such collection methods, the study team relies on unstructured

The congressional oversight committees have been among CSI's biggest champions and supporters of its Lessons Learned Program.

and semistructured interviews of participants.

These interviews aim to capture firsthand perspectives from participants, partners, and witnesses. Document collection is also a critical part of the methodology. With all of the data in hand, the study team conducts an objective interpretation and analysis to dispassionately describe what actually happened and generate findings that offer both lessons learned and best practices. The work is done by current and retired practitioners, including former senior leaders. CSI receives direct tasking from CIA's senior leaders and the congressional oversight committees for specific studies.

The program differs from that of the Office of Inspector General's (OIG's) Inspection Staff. Inspectors apply the same rigor in collecting data and assessing the sufficiency and appropriateness of information. Unlike the CSI program, the Inspection Staff focuses more on systemic challenges and known problems, and they make recommendations for corrective actions. Inspectors must also ensure that agency programs and activities are in compliance with laws, executive orders, and regulations.

In contrast, CSI's studies rarely offer recommendations. The center lacks the organizational authority to direct and enforce specific changes. Nevertheless, when the findings of a lessons-learned study are well grounded, the implications are evident and subsequent recommendations are best shaped not by the study team but by the stakeholders. CSI's approach examines both successes and failures and connects the workforce in ways that strengthen its professionalism and enhance organizational performance. The steady increase in the number and scope of requests for new studies by CIA seniors since the program was first launched reflects the value they now place on this approach to the study of intelligence.

Congressional Support

The congressional oversight committees have been among CSI's biggest champions and supporters of its Lessons Learned Program. The committees have advocated investments in self-examination and introspection through formal lessons learned studies as a way of improving internal processes. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the 2009 Intelligence Authorization Act noted, "The Committee firmly believes that for the CIA to truly become a learning organization—one in which knowledge is captured, preserved, and shared with those who can benefit—the CIA must institutionalize the lessons learned process and develop policy supporting that effort."[60]

With DCI Hayden directing CSI to assume responsibility for a more focused and disciplined approach to identifying lessons, the center's scholars would continually improve and refine the methodological approach to their studies. The results of these efforts would become a big part of CSI's overall knowledge fund.

Emerging Trends Program

In 2010, CSI took another leap forward in broadening the scope of its mission by turning its attention to the future of intelligence. It published a study that looked at the emerging trends that would likely have an effect on the business of intelligence. *Where Tomorrow Will Take Us: The New Environment for Intelligence* introduced intelligence professionals to the trends in technology, business, and society to raise their awareness of the rapid and far-reaching changes they would face in the next three to five years.[61]

Shortly afterward, CSI established the Emerging Trends (ET) Program with a commitment to continually monitor these trends and inform the workforce so that the CIA could be best postured to confront the challenges or take advantage of the opportunities arising from the expected changes. Using an array of rigorous foresight activities, ET researchers and writers produced an impressive collection of short essays and longer monographs on a wide range of potentially disruptive changes such as ubiquitous technical surveillance, artificial intelligence, identity in the digital age, a world of abundant data, synthetic media, neurodiversity at work, the internet of things, and organizational transformation.

Support to ODNI

When General Clapper became DNI in summer 2010, he sought to streamline the size of ODNI and establish more efficient operations. Accordingly, he asked DCIA Leon Panetta to take on the responsibility of managing ODNI's modest lessons-learned and history programs.

DNI James Clapper (right), with Lt. Gen. Thomas P. Bostick, chief of engineers and commanding general of the US Army Corps of Engineers, visiting the museum at the Intelligence Community Campus–Bethesda in October 2015. Clapper was a strong proponent of IC history and lessons-learned programs. (ODNI photo)

From his experience in the IC, Clapper had viewed CSI as the gold standard for capturing and sharing knowledge on the intelligence business. Panetta agreed, and in fall 2011 CSI formally took on the role as the executive agent for the ODNI's programs.

As the office responsible for managing *Studies in Intelligence*, CSI already had a role to play in supporting the entire IC. CSI used the ODNI's existing intelligence-related studies as a foundation and began to systematically build up a knowledge repository that would address ODNI and IC areas of interest. ODNI senior leaders provided CSI with specific guidance on topics they wanted addressed, either as a history or a lessons-learned study. As the ODNI executive agent, CSI accordingly furthered its reach to the professionals at ODNI and other IC agencies.

Knowledge Management

Since its creation, CSI has, in a centralized fashion, served as an enterprise capability for knowledge management. Yet much of the historical and current information on the agency's business operations and practices is retained in a decentralized fashion across the various components. With the goal of bringing CSI's knowledge-management practices directly into the agency's directorates and mission centers, the center in 2017 established the Knowledge Management Referent Program.

Under this program, CSI deploys referents—typically senior annuitants—directly into component workspaces to survey existing knowledge holdings, identify gaps in relevant knowledge, and support the knowledge-management efforts already under way. Component referents also interview individuals involved in recent important intelligence activities and carry out after-action reviews. The referents strive to connect people within the component to ensure that relevant knowledge is captured and shared when needed. Given that much of a component's specific knowledge would have application across the agency, the overall goal of the program is not only to ensure that component professionals have ready access to such knowledge but also that these holdings can be made part of an enterprise repository available to the entire CIA workforce where appropriate.

Academic Literature

CIA's overall approach to building a knowledge fund that advances the professional development of the workforce and contributes to the agency's performance offers a contrast to that which prevails in academia. Before the 1980s, little was written about intelligence by academic scholars. This was partly due to the fact that no journals were devoted exclusively to the business of intelligence. Articles on intelligence could occasionally be found in social science, history, and political science journals as well as publications devoted to foreign policy and national security such as *Foreign Affairs.*

As interest in intelligence matters grew in US colleges and universities, so too did the outlets for publishing serious writings on the topic. The journal *Intelligence and National Security* appeared in January 1986. As stated in the first issue's editorial, "*Intelligence and National Security* is the first scholarly, interdisciplinary journal devoted to the past history of intelligence work, to the analysis of its contemporary functions and

Academic writing on intelligence has, for the most part, fallen into four categories: historical, theoretical, organizational, and governance.

problems, and to the assessment of its influence on foreign policy and national security."[62] As a peer-reviewed journal, *Intelligence and National Security*'s major contributors were academics.

Shortly thereafter, the *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, was launched in spring 1986. The editor-in-chief at the time, F. Reese Brown, articulated the objective of this new quarterly journal: "The *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* is devoted to exploring the methods and techniques used in the various facets of intelligence work as well as investigating the processes used in developing national estimates and other forms of finished intelligence."[63]

Over the next 15 years, no other non-US-government–sponsored journal on intelligence would emerge. But academics' interest in the topic slowly increased. For example, the number of panels devoted to discussing intelligence matters at the International Studies Association annual conventions recurrently expanded with academics participating in growing numbers.

Increased Focus

The 9/11 attacks and the controversy over Iraq's WMD programs spurred much greater attention in the academic world on intelligence. Scholarly writings appreciably increased, and new journals devoted to intelligence such as the *Journal of Intelligence History* (beginning in 2001) were published. In addition to the scholarly exploration of intelligence, courses and even formal degree programs began taking root in colleges and universities.

Academic writing on intelligence has, for the most part, fallen into four categories: historical, theoretical, organizational, and governance. Intelligence histories or case studies provide a descriptive look into intelligence analyses and operations. Theoretical works explore intelligence definitions and methodologies in the abstract. Organizational writings cover the functions and evolution of intelligence institutions. Governance looks at the role of intelligence in national security policy making and the place of intelligence in society. British scholar Michael Goodman breaks down the academic writing even more simply: "In its purest form, the study of intelligence can either be predominantly historically case-study-based or it can be primarily abstract in nature."[64]

The contributors to the academic literature on intelligence vary widely. Historians, political scientists, psychologists, anthropologists, and other social scientists have explored various aspects of intelligence. Journalists and former practitioners have also added their insights on current and past intelligence activities.

The growth of academic research and writing on intelligence has also led to a greater focus on how the academic world should approach intelligence as a field of scholarship. For example, in 2019 Stephen Coulthart, Michael Landon-Murray, and Damien Van Payvelde published a collection of essays called *Researching National Security Intelligence: Multidisciplinary Approaches*.[65] Their aim was to provide guidance to intelligence scholars and draw attention to the various methods and perspectives that have been used in the field of intelligence scholarship.

Scholars looked to advance the theoretical and practical understanding of intelligence by applying the scientific methods and other rigorous methodologies of social science disciplines to their studies. Michael Kobi and Aaron Kornbluth from the Institute for National Security Studies have noted, "The approach taken to study the multi-dimensional subject depends largely on the academic department in which intelligence studies is nestled. An intelligence program within a history department will approach intelligence differently than an intelligence program that studies it from a political science lens. The interdisciplinary nature of intelligence allows it to behave this way and for the different schools of intelligence to emphasize one approach over another."[66] Coulthart, Landon-Murray, and Van Payvelde suggested that a multi-disciplinary approach will encourage the broadest possible study of intelligence in a university setting.[67]

Broad Audience

Given today's numerous outlets for sharing the results of research, analysis, and reporting on the business of intelligence, the audience for such writing is very broad. Academics have many considerations to take into account as they approach any serious research and writing—achieving tenure being one of them. At a 1993 symposium on teaching intelligence, Columbia Professor Richard Betts also pointed out, "Most academic research is 'relatively

incestuous,' appearing in journals primarily read by experts like oneself."[68] The late Harvard Professor Ernest May also weighed in on the circumscribed nature of early academic writing on intelligence: "The revolution in intelligence scholarship, however, has been largely self-contained. It has not so far had much effect outside its own inner circle. Writing on intelligence rarely appears in other learned journals."[69]

In the 30 years since Betts and May made their observations, the reach of the academic scholars has expanded. Beyond the academic world, intelligence scholarship plays a valuable role in keeping the public informed of a government activity that has been shrouded in secrecy and the subject of many myths and misunderstandings. Finally, scholars and writers on intelligence hope to reach the intelligence practitioners with the insights they uncovered in the course of their research.

Obstacles to Scholarship

Scholars who pursue intelligence face a number of challenges not found in other academic disciplines. Access to information is the most formidable. Because of the protection of sources and methods, academics acknowledge that they will not have the complete documentary record on any sensitive topic they are researching. For example, obtaining source material on most covert operations is rarely possible. Also, because of their lifelong obligation to protect classified information, former intelligence officers are not free to disclose and discuss such matters with academic researchers. Academics, thus, will be constrained in the information they can obtain from interviews of former practitioners.

The declassification of material through Freedom of Information Act requests, documents made available through 25-year and 50 year declassification mandates, and the release of thematic document collections by CIA's Historical Programs Group have provided some of the material that academic scholars need.

The declassification of material through Freedom of Information Act requests, documents made available through 25- and 50-year declassification mandates, and the release of thematic document collections by CIA's Historical Programs Group have provided some of the material that academic scholars need. Serious scholars, however, might understandably view such releases as handpicked and insufficient to their needs.[70]

Furthermore, the released papers alone do not provide academic scholars with the necessary orientation and context from which those documents emerged. Scholars who have never served in any of the IC agencies will lack insight into the respective organizational cultures and how those cultures change over time and influence intelligence practices. Former DCIA Hayden, in looking at the intelligence-policy relationship, highlighted the different tribes—the policymakers and the intelligence professionals—and how difficult it was for one tribe to understand the other. For the outside intelligence scholar, penetrating and appreciating these tribes are even more difficult. Former National Intelligence Council Chair Greg Treverton observed, "The institutional culture of intelligence in general and of the CIA in particular is not easy for scholars to understand, but without such an understanding it is difficult to comprehend what has happened and is happening in foreign affairs."[71]

Scholars can also take advantage of leaks, although they present their own challenges in verifying such information but also in understanding who leaked and why?[72] Furthermore, scholars must weigh the national security costs of citing information that, even if verified, is still regarded as classified by the government.

Even with these prevailing constraints, the growth in the academic study of intelligence has not slowed. This type of research and writing reaches beyond the borders of the United States to include the United Kingdom and Canada, among other nations. As noted earlier, scholars from various backgrounds are employing different methodologies and exploring a wide variety of intelligence-related topics.

A number of former intelligence officers have pursued second careers as university professors. Consequently, their academic colleagues have benefited from discussions on matters that the formers are free to talk about. A thorough accounting and review of the academics' work can reveal basic facts as to who is writing, what they are writing about, and where they are publishing. The influence and impact of academic scholarship on intelligence on those both inside and outside the IC have yet to be determined. Nevertheless, the academic approach and subsequent body of literature have, to some degree, supplemented the study of intelligence as carried out at CIA.

Greg Treverton, shown here discussing the launch of the unclassified NIC report *Global Trends* in January 2017, has stressed that scholars need to understand the culture of intelligence. (ODNI photo)

Conclusion

For more than 70 years, CIA leaders have allocated resources and assigned personnel to studying the intelligence profession and documenting CIA's history. Even though the level of effort expended against these activities has varied during that time, the uninterrupted focus on capturing and sharing experiences and insights on the intelligence business has enabled the development of increasingly more thorough and advanced research methods and the creation of a valuable and accessible body of knowledge. While the organizational alignment and size of the units devoted to the study of intelligence have shifted and changed over time, the one constant has been their independence and ability to carry out their work objectively. To that end, the support of the DCIA, and recently the DNI, has been imperative.

CIA has primarily turned to experienced intelligence officers, both current and former, to study the intelligence profession. Their familiarity with intelligence tradecraft and practices, critical thinking skills, and exposure to IC cultures provide them with the necessary background and qualifications to effectively capture, analyze, and share knowledge on intelligence. Outside historians and other scholars, to a lesser degree, have also been part of the overall effort by writing intelligence histories and drafting articles for *Studies in Intelligence*.

Over time, CIA and IC officers have covered all aspects of the intelligence profession. Their access to IC records and their ability to draw upon the experiences and insights of fellow practitioners have enabled them produce in-depth studies that address a wide range of operational, analytical, administrative, organizational, and leadership challenges. Topics that were once left unexamined when resources and staff personnel were limited, such as covert action programs, have in recent years been studied in great detail for lessons and best practices.

The results of the studies on these important issues have been made available in variety of ways. Books, monographs, articles, and short essays make up the vast portion. But

other communication forms such as video documentaries, audio interview segments, museum artifacts and exhibits, conferences and seminars, lectures and briefings, and interactive multimedia products have been introduced to make the available knowledge more accessible.

The work of those who study intelligence is designed for intelligence professionals. Histories, lessons-learned studies, and other insights are captured with this audience in mind. The focus of the study of intelligence has been on topics of interest and value to IC leaders and practitioners. Well-documented histories and the identification of lessons and best practices from a wide range of intelligence operations and activities provide intelligence officers with learning points to avoid repeating mistakes and take advantage of relevant and adaptable successes.

Specific articles, studies, histories, and trend reports have had a direct impact on individuals and organizations. The progress made by CIA in this field of study, however, cannot be judged solely by the completion of any one product or collection of histories and studies, but rather by looking at the cumulative insights, experiences, lessons, and best practices on all aspects of intelligence. Sherman Kent recognized 70 years ago that intelligence, as a developing discipline, had no permanent institutional memory and lacked a literature. The long-term goal behind the study of intelligence has been to create and grow a body of knowledge that ultimately contributes to mission success. The knowledge fund that Kent envisioned now exists, but it requires constant attention to ensure that its holdings remain relevant to current and future challenges.

The author: Dr. Peter Usowski was, except for a brief interlude, director of CSI and chair of the *Studies* editorial board from 2011 into early 2023. He has also been a contributor to the journal, with his first article on the subject of geospatial intelligence, appearing in March 1990. He retired from CIA in 2023.

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69. Ernest R. May, "Studying and Teaching Intelligence," *Studies in Intelligence* 38, no. 1 (1994), 1.
70. See Travis D. Stolz's review in this edition of The Declassification Engine by Matthew Connelly.
71. Center for the Study of Intelligence, *Symposium*, 17.
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The Story Behind the Unprecedented Open Testimony on Soviet Strategic Forces

Christopher A. Williams

During the Cold War, public testimony by senior US intelligence officials describing highly classified IC estimates of foreign military capabilities was not only not the norm, it was unheard of.

Today, senior US intelligence officials regularly provide unclassified testimony to Congress. For example, the director of national intelligence, accompanied by the directors of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and others in March 2023 delivered unclassified annual threat assessments to the House and Senate armed services and intelligence oversight committees. These highly publicized hearings are carefully tracked by friends, allies, and adversaries of the United States as well as the public, who seek to learn more about the US Intelligence Community's judgments on current and emerging threats.

This public-facing persona of the IC has become routine—in fact, it is generally expected that senior IC officials will provide unclassified testimony and assessments on various topics of interest to Congress. Yet this degree of openness has certainly not always been the case. Indeed, during the Cold War, public testimony by senior US intelligence officials describing highly classified IC estimates of foreign military capabilities was not only not the norm, it was unheard of.

In an unprecedented move, on June 26, 1985, two senior National Intelligence Council (NIC) officials, Dr. Robert Gates, its chairman,[a] and Dr. Lawrence Gershwin, the national intelligence officer (NIO) for strategic programs, testified before a joint open session of the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces (Senate Armed Services Committee) and the Subcommittee on Defense (Senate Appropriations Committee). C-SPAN broadcast the event. They presented a declassified version of a Top Secret National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Soviet strategic force developments that had been published in late April of that year.

The very fact of their appearance in a public hearing on such a sensitive topic and at such a tense time in US-Soviet relations marked a major milestone in the evolution of the IC's role in helping inform decisionmakers in Congress and the public about threats to US national security. It also served to help elevate the stature of the NIC as the IC's premier analytic organization.

This article sheds light on several key aspects of this watershed event, including the international security environment and domestic political context in which the testimony took place, how the public testimony of the two senior NIC officials came about, the conduct of the hearing itself, and domestic and international

a. From September 1, 1983, to April 18, 1986, Gates served concurrently as CIA's deputy director for intelligence and chairman of the NIC.

The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.

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press coverage of the testimony. It concludes with some observations on the importance and impact of the hearing.

Setting the Stage

In the early 1980s, under newly elected President Ronald Reagan, the United States launched a multifaceted strategic campaign intended to undermine and ultimately defeat the Soviet Union. The central elements of the campaign were enshrined in a series of policy documents signed by the president, including National Security Decision Directives 32 and 75 (NSDD-32 and -75).

NSDD-32, "US National Security Strategy" (May 20, 1982), stated that a key objective of US national security policy is

> *to contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world and to increase the costs of Soviet support and use of proxy, terrorist, and subversive forces* [and] *to foster, if possible in concert with our allies, restraint in Soviet military spending, discourage Soviet adventurism and weaken the Soviet alliance system…and to encourage long-term liberalizing and nationalist tendencies within the Soviet Union and allied countries.*

Similarly, NSDD-75, "US Relations with the USSR" (January 17, 1983) directed that

> *US policy toward the Soviet Union will consist of three elements: external resistance to Soviet imperialism; internal pressure on the USSR to weaken the sources of Soviet imperialism; and negotiations to eliminate, on the basis of strict reciprocity, outstanding disagreements.*

In essence, the Reagan strategy called for an integrated, whole-of-government campaign to combat Soviet power and exploit perceived Soviet internal weaknesses via diplomacy, ideological warfare, political activities, economic/trade restrictions, military measures, covert action, and other steps, with the ultimate goal of accelerating the demise of the Soviet Union in favor of a more moderate form of government. This included significant increases in US defense spending, rapid improvements in ground, sea, and air forces, and a major emphasis on modernizing US strategic nuclear forces in response to the Soviet buildup of nuclear forces that began nearly two decades earlier.[a]

A central premise of the Reagan buildup of the US military, and of US strategic nuclear forces in particular, was the widespread concern that the Soviet Union had achieved a degree of strategic superiority over the United States. Indeed, NSDD-32 stated

> *The modernization of our strategic nuclear forces and the achievement of parity with the Soviet Union shall receive first priority in our efforts to rebuild the military capabilities of the United States.... The United States will enhance its strategic nuclear deterrent by developing a capability to sustain protracted nuclear conflict.*

This bold and aggressive anti-Soviet strategy—one that placed an emphasis on US nuclear force modernization to achieve a credible nuclear deterrence and warfighting capability—ushered in a period of high tension in the US-Soviet relationship. The strategy was based not only on the long-held anticommunist views of Reagan himself but also was informed by formal NIC assessments of Soviet strategy, intentions, and capabilities, especially in the area of Moscow's modernization and expansion of its strategic nuclear forces.

Consistent with a more assertive, confrontational approach toward the Soviet Union, on March 23, 1983, Reagan delivered a speech announcing the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the aim of which was to develop advanced US ballistic missile defense systems and capabilities in order to "render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete." Kremlin leaders, already deeply troubled by the US strategic nuclear modernization program and the broader anti-Soviet campaign, viewed the president's SDI announcement with great concern. They saw it as a thinly veiled effort to undermine and devalue the primary element of the Soviet Union's claim to superpower status, namely, the

a. For insights into President Reagan as an intelligence customer, see Richard J. Kerr and Peter Dixon Davis, "Mornings in Pacific Palisades: Ronald Reagan and the *President's Daily Brief*," *Studies in Intelligence* 43, no. 4 (1999).

nuclear-tipped missiles of the vaunted Strategic Rocket Forces. The United States would later learn that some key Soviet officials privately acknowledged that the Soviet Union was in a poor position to effectively respond to Reagan's high-priority program to harness the West's latent economic and technological strength to eventually achieve military superiority over the increasingly sclerotic Soviet system.

Soviet leader (and former KGB director) Yuri Andropov in particular was deeply concerned about a possible US nuclear first-strike. As part of Operation RYaN (*raketno-yadernoye napadenie*, or "nuclear missile attack"), KGB officials in Washington, London, and other NATO capitals were ordered to expand their intelligence collection activities to detect any signs of preparations for a surprise US nuclear missile attack. During this same period, ABLE ARCHER 83, a NATO military command post exercise, was nearly mistaken by Soviet military officials as cover for a nuclear attack against the Soviet Union.[a]

Adding to the risk of miscalculation was the turnover in Soviet leadership. Leonid Brezhnev died on November 10, 1982; Yuri Andropov died on February 9, 1984; and Konstantin Chernenko died on March 10, 1985. Mikhail Gorbachev, who promised to radically reshape the Soviet state and political system through *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (reform), took control on March 15, 1985.

While the US-Soviet relationship was filled with tension, the domestic political landscape in the United States at the time of the landmark hearing was fractious and divisive.

Gorbachev, of course, would soon become known for directing the removal of Soviet occupation forces from Afghanistan, signing the US-Soviet Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty to eliminate an entire class of nuclear-capable missiles, and taking steps that eventually led to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact military alliance and the collapse of the Soviet Union itself. In June 1985, however, the Cold War competition was still very much alive as Gorbachev was new to the job and focused primarily on consolidating his domestic power base.

While the US-Soviet relationship was filled with tension, the domestic political landscape in the United States at the time of the landmark hearing was fractious and divisive. Despite his personal popularity and the overwhelming margin of his 1984 reelection, Reagan's confrontational policy toward the Soviet Union had numerous domestic critics, and his strategic nuclear force modernization program remained highly controversial in some quarters of Congress and with elements of the US public. Democrats in Congress also pared back the administration's request to significantly increase spending on SDI and tied funding for various elements of the president's strategic nuclear modernization program to a requirement to enter into negotiations with the Soviets to reduce such forces.

Also during this period, public fears about a possible nuclear war reached a crescendo. *The Day After*, a made-for-television movie that aired in late 1983, captured 100 million viewers with its portrayal of devastation and hopelessness after a US-Soviet nuclear exchange. Millions marched in Paris, Bonn, and other European capitals in opposition to the planned deployment of US Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe. Others rallied around the simplistic notion of a "freeze" on US and Soviet nuclear deployments. (In fact, adoption of a nuclear freeze at that stage would have locked in Soviet superiority in IRBMs, given the extensive deployment of nuclear-tipped SS-20 missiles targeting Europe.) US officials in both the executive and legislative branches were forced to deal with growing public concern about a possible nuclear war.

Many Democrats, encouraged and supported by proarms-control think tanks and grassroots lobbying organizations, viewed Reagan's hard-line anti-Soviet policies as dangerous and misguided. Consistent with this perspective, they viewed efforts to publicize Soviet strategic

a. On February 15, 1990, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) in a classified report concluded that the United States "may have inadvertently placed our relations with the Soviet Union on a hair trigger" during ABLE ARCHER 83. According to the report, "From the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, the military forces and intelligence services of the Soviet Union were redirected in ways that suggested that the Soviet leadership was seriously concerned about the possibility of a sudden strike launched by the United States and its NATO allies." The report was declassified in October 2015 and is available at https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2013-015-doc1.pdf. See also Benjamin B. Fischer, *A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare* (CIA/Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1997).

Throughout the early 1980s, several Republican senators ... sought to publicize Soviet nuclear force developments as a means of bolstering support for the strategic modernization program espoused by Reagan.

force modernization and possible arms control violations as unhelpful to the cause of countering what they perceived to be Reagan's dangerously militaristic policies. This constituency viewed the combination of the Reagan strategic nuclear force buildup together with the so-called Star Wars ballistic missile defense program as highly provocative. As an alternative approach, Reagan's critics demanded a greater emphasis on US-Soviet arms control negotiations to prevent what they saw as a "run-away arms race" and to lessen the risk of a catastrophic nuclear war. While willing to enter US-Soviet arms control talks, Reagan was under no illusion that such talks would bear fruit while the Soviets held military superiority.

In sum, the international strategic environment of the early-to-mid-1980s could best be described as highly tense and fraught with danger as Reagan sought to undermine the Soviet Union through various means, including US strategic force modernization and development of ballistic missile defenses. Meanwhile, the US domestic political situation reflected deep-rooted tension between the strong-willed Republican president and opposition lawmakers who were determined to rein in what they viewed as some of the more dangerous elements of the president's ideological and militaristic campaign against the Soviet Union.

Calls for a Hearing

During this period of escalating tensions in the US-Soviet relationship, NIEs played a central role in helping inform senior executive-branch officials of the serious threat posed by the modernization of and growth in the number of Soviet strategic nuclear forces. At the same time, the fact that the estimates were highly classified served to limit their distribution and constrain the influence the estimates might have had in congressional debates over funding for the president's strategic modernization program.

As noted by former CIA Inspector General L. Britt Snider, during this period

> *the oversight committees continued to receive most of the finished intelligence produced by the IC and could call upon analytic elements within the Community—in particular, CIA, DIA, NSA and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)—for briefings and other types of substantive support. In the early 1980s, the oversight committees began receiving copies of NIEs, which they previously had been allowed to read but could not store."*[a]

Even with access to such materials, however, unclassified public hearings on individual NIEs or analytic products had never occurred.

Throughout the early 1980s, several Republican senators, including James McClure from Wyoming, Steve Symms from Idaho, and Jesse Helms from North Carolina, among others, sought to publicize Soviet nuclear force developments as a means of bolstering support for the strategic modernization program espoused by Reagan. In addition, they pressed the administration to release information regarding Soviet violations of arms control agreements, including the SALT I Agreement on strategic offensive nuclear delivery vehicles and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that restricted ballistic missile defense systems.

This effort gained considerable momentum in early 1985. For example, during a closed hearing on February 25, 1985, Sen. Ted Stevens (R-AK), who chaired the powerful Senate Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, and other Republican senators pressed Reagan administration witnesses to reveal more intelligence information on the Soviet nuclear threat. Likewise, several senators raised these issues in personal conversations with the president and senior administration officials.

On June 6, 1985, McClure, Symms, and Helms sent Reagan another letter asking him to release as much information as possible from the recently published NIE on Soviet strategic force developments. According to press reports, the letter asserted that the new NIE predicted "a dangerously worsening state of Soviet military supremacy…. We consider a full public understanding of the evolving military imbalance

a. L. Britt Snider, *Sharing Secrets with Lawmakers: Congress as a User of Intelligence* (CIA, CSI, February 1997).

between the US and the Soviet Union to be essential."

By the time the McClure-Symms-Helms letter was submitted, Reagan had already been convinced of the potential value of releasing additional information on Soviet strategic force developments in order to help inform the public debate and provide valuable context on the need for US strategic force modernization, which as noted above had come under fire from congressional Democrats. While the annual unclassified DoD report *Soviet Military Power* and other official publications included broad descriptions of Soviet strategic modernization activities, Reagan and his key advisers concluded that declassifying the most recent NIE could indeed have an even greater impact in pending congressional debates over the US strategic modernization program.

Casey holding an unidentified NIE during a National Security Planning Group meeting in November 1983. President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Secretaries of State and Defense Shultz and Weinberger, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and National Security Advisor McFarlane were in attendance. Photo courtesy of the Reagan Library.

In late April or early May the president directed Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) William Casey to declassify the estimate published on April 26th, consistent with the protection of sensitive intelligence sources and methods. In response, Casey ask NIC Chairman Dr. Robert Gates to lead the effort. To assist him with the task, Gates turned to Dr. Lawrence Gershwin, the NIC's seniormost analyst on Soviet strategic forces and primary author of the 11-3/8 series of Top Secret NIEs that projected future Soviet strategic force developments.[a]

Gershwin led an accelerated process to gain interagency approval of a declassified version of the NIE and what ultimately would become the prepared testimony submitted to Congress. The review focused primarily on determining whether the key judgments from the lengthy executive summary could be declassified without damaging sensitive intelligence sources and methods. Gershwin recalled the review concentrated on declassifying as much of the existing NIE as possible, as opposed to drafting a separate, new unclassified analytic product.

Once made aware of the president's directive to DCI Casey to declassify the NIE, senators searched for an appropriate venue. They settled on a joint session of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense and the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces to be held in late June. In turn, the chairs of the two subcommittees invited Casey to testify. Never a fan of congressional testimony, Casey demurred and instead tasked Gates and Gershwin to testify in his place. Gershwin recalled to this author, there was no "murder board" prior to the hearing; both men were confident in their detailed knowledge of the subject matter and their ability to avoid discussion of classified material.

a. Gershwin recounted to this author, "NIEs were assigned numbers depending on country and subject matter. 11 was the Soviet Union, 3 was strategic defense, and 8 was strategic offensive forces. At one time in the 1970s, there were separate NIEs on Soviet offensive and defensive forces. These were combined in the late 1970s, so it became 11-3/8 to indicate both topics were covered in the same NIE."

At 10:07 a.m. on June 26, 1985, in Dirksen Senate Office Building Room 192, Sen. Stevens banged the gavel to formally open the public hearing. Thus began the highly anticipated public testimony on the declassified NIE on Soviet strategic force developments.

It is also worth noting that NIE had been the subject of unauthorized disclosures after its publication. For example, a June 17, 1985, article by Peter Samuel in *Defense Week* disclosed several of the key judgments in the NIE.[a]

Six days before the hearing, Sen. Sam Nunn (D-GA), the ranking member on the Senate Armed Services Committee, wrote a letter to Committee Chairman Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-AZ). In it, Nunn provided his views on the pros and cons of the proposed open hearing on the NIE. In the "pros" side, Nunn stated, "An open hearing would provide another opportunity to bring important information on the present and projected Soviet threat before the American public. You and I have both urged that more information on Soviet strategic developments be declassified. The hearing would be timely due to on-going arms control efforts and congressional deliberations on the Fiscal Year 1986 defense budget."

On the "cons" side, he wrote

> *If the intelligence community knows that future NIEs are going to be declassified, it could have a chilling effect on the preparation of this important document. Participating agencies might be more prone to register their dissent on key findings and may offer views they believe are attuned to the political landscape of the moment. The result could be a more fragmented intelligence community and a politicized NIE.*
>
> *There are already a number of vehicles for informing the public on this subject, including the Secretary's annual report, the JCS* [Joint Chiefs of Staff] *posture statement,* Soviet Military Power*, and the publication of declassified Committee hearings. In all these cases, the data and projections are not directly attributed to the NIE, thereby preserving the integrity and exclusivity of this document, which is one of our most highly classified matters.*
>
> *If you feel that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages and that the hearing should be conducted, I would strongly urge that you not associate the hearing with the NIE or the NIE process. I would stress that this hearing should be characterized by our hearing notice and by those making the presentation as strictly an unclassified CIA force projection and not a sanitized version of the latest NIE.*
>
> *I remain concerned that the precedent of selectively declassifying NIEs could seriously damage an intelligence product that must be totally objective and non-partisan.*[b]

This author is unaware of any response by Goldwater to Nunn. Regardless, planning for the hearing proceeded apace.

Hearing Day Arrives

News articles on the prepared testimony of the two senior NIC officials appeared on the morning the hearing was scheduled to take place. For example, *Washington Times* reporter Bill Gertz wrote, "The Soviet Union's potential to rapidly deploy a nationwide missile defense, if carried out, could dwarf any Soviet arms control violations to date, according to an Administration analyst. The warning of the emerging Soviet capability to throw up a shield against offensive nuclear missiles was issued in a report prepared for delivery today before a joint congressional panel."[c]

At 10:07 a.m. on June 26, 1985, in Dirksen Senate Office Building Room 192, Senator Stevens banged the gavel to formally open the public hearing. Thus began the highly anticipated public testimony on the declassified NIE on Soviet strategic force developments. In his welcoming remarks, Stevens stated, "We are able to conduct an open hearing because information has been recently declassified by the Intelligence Community in response to Congressional requests.... Actually, many members of Congress have repeatedly urged the administration to make more of this kind of information on Soviet strategic force developments available

a. Peter Samuel, "Big Soviet Buildup Foreseen," *Defense Week*, June 17, 1985.
b. Letter from Sen. Sam Nunn to Sen. Barry Goldwater, June 20, 1985.
c. Bill Gertz, "CIA report says Soviet anti-missile shield possible," *Washington Times*, June 26, 1985.

to the general public. The extent of the massive Soviet buildup of nuclear strike forces, I think, will be illuminating."

In his opening remarks, Sen. John Warner (R-VA) stated, "I, too, have been frustrated by our inability as senators to share the facts about the Soviet strategic force buildup with the American public, indeed, the free world. In my view, these facts served as sound justification for the decisions made by President Reagan and his predecessors with respect to the need for strategic force modernization…. Today's testimony...will provide an authoritative basis for public debate on such critical issues as strategic force modernization, strategic defense, and arms control."

Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-SC) noted that "It is paradoxical in a democracy that those who are constitutionally charged with providing for the common defense cannot use all the information at their disposal to inform the public of the grave nature of the threat we face."

Stevens then turned to the witnesses. In his opening remarks, Gates stated

> *Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe a word or two about why we are here is warranted before beginning the briefing. We believe there is merit in a comprehensive, authoritative description of Soviet strategic force developments being available to all the Members of the Congress and the public….*
>
> *For more than a decade, each year the CIA and DIA have provided to the public a detailed report on the Soviet economy under the auspices of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress. We have received many requests from Members of Congress and the executive branch for a similar, unclassified intelligence assessment of Soviet strategic force developments. This briefing responds to those requests….*
>
> *The material we will present today has been carefully reviewed by elements of the IC to safeguard intelligence sources and methods. Our hope is that this briefing and perhaps others in the future might reduce damaging leaks of intelligence information at least somewhat.*
>
> *The assessment we present today represents the agreed views of all elements of the American intelligence community. It is not a net assessment, nor are we in a position to provide one.*

Once Gershwin completed his reading of the prepared testimony, it was the senators' turn to question the witnesses. Their lines of questioning spanned a broad range of substantive topics.

Gershwin then read the prepared joint statement (10 pages of single-spaced text and six pages of graphics). His presentation began

> *By the mid-Nineties, nearly all of the Soviets' currently deployed intercontinental nuclear attack forces and land and sea-based ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, will be replaced by new and improved systems. New mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles and a variety of cruise missiles are about to enter the force. The number of deployed strategic-force warheads will increase by a few thousand over the next 5 years, with the potential for greater expansion in the 1990s.*
>
> *We are concerned about the Soviets' longstanding commitment to strategic defense, including an extensive program to protect their leadership, their potential to deploy widespread defenses against ballistic missiles, and their extensive efforts in directed-energy weapons technologies, including high-energy lasers.*

Gershwin provided unclassified estimates of projected Soviet strategic force developments, military doctrine, and arms control considerations. Once Gershwin completed his prepared testimony, it was the senators' turn to question the witnesses. Their lines of questioning spanned a broad range of substantive topics.

Warner asked, "[I]s this estimate more somber or pessimistic than the ones given previously in classified hearings in the years before this or is it a fairly constant trend?" Gershwin responded, "Fundamentally, the trend has been evident for a number of years…. [The] briefing does not present a startling new picture of what we have been briefing to the Congress…. We are able to conclude that we are witnessing what amounts to a replacement of the entire force...."

Sen. William Proxmire (D-WI) raised the issue of CIA estimates of the percentage increase in Soviet defense spending, asking, "Isn't it the case that CIA's forecasts have been wrong in the past and haven't we just

Some Democratic senators questioned whether such an open hearing should have been conducted at all, in light of concerns over protecting sensitive intelligence sources and methods and possible politicization of the intelligence process.

gone through a period when the CIA was estimating 4-percent growth, then revised downward their estimate to 2-percent growth? Doesn't that mean we can't have much confidence in this kind of estimate now?" Gates replied, "I think the most honest answer to that is that our estimates of the cost of Soviet forces are analytical reconstructions…. No one has ever made a claim that effort is a particularly exact science.… What we do know is what we see on the ground in terms of their military capability."

Sen. James Sasser (D-TN) asked a number of questions concerning the ability of Soviet missiles to attack and defeat US ICBM silos. In response, Gershwin stated, "The Soviets' capability today against the Minuteman silos is substantial, but not perfect by any means. Without getting into numbers, we expect the Soviets certainly will improve the accuracy of their new missiles and that accuracy improvement will lead to a lower survival rate for a Minuteman silo when attacked by them. Their capability today, we don't make a complete evaluation of Minuteman survivability because that is a Defense Department effort as well, but it is certainly not our intention to create the impression that the Soviets today could destroy all Minuteman silos."

Sasser also asked, "Do you believe the Soviets will be able to achieve a nuclear superiority over the United States, whatever that means?" In response, Gates commented, "I would say, Senator, that depends entirely on what the United States does. The trends in Soviet defense programs over the past 20 years, particularly in the strategic arena, are clear. How that nets out depends on what the other side does."

Sen. John Glenn (D-OH) asked whether it would be "fair to characterize the Soviet forces in general as going more mobile… moving to mobile, to cruise missiles and submarine-launched missiles." Gershwin replied:

> *That is fair, but I would come back to the point that the Soviets are going to serious modernization programs for their silo-based missile force including a new heavy ICBM which is too large to be put anywhere except in the silos. That is a serious Soviet effort. The result of that effort will be a silo-based ICBM force of a substantial proportion, for at least 20 years. So, it is dangerous to overshoot in assuming the trend toward mobility is away from silos entirely. It is not. In fact, it is essentially a balance among several types of forces. Silo-based ICBMs will be a rather predominant aspect of their military forces for the rest of the century.*

In response to a statement by Sen. Dan Quayle (R-IN) that "Clearly, the SS-X-24 and the SS-X-25 and possibly the follow-on SS-18 will be violations of the SALT II agreement," Gershwin replied, "That is not clear. What we are saying is, for instance, the new SS-18 follow-on we think will be, from a normal definition, a new missile. But if its characteristics were to come out to be the same as those of the SS-18 in terms of those characteristics enumerated in SALT II if they were the same, then whether they were a violation would not be in question…. You really cannot predict until something is flight tested."

Some Democratic senators questioned whether such an open hearing should have been conducted at all, in light of concerns over protecting sensitive intelligence sources and methods and possible politicization of the intelligence process.

> Proxmire: *Let me tell you about what disturbs me about your appearance here. It seems to me it has more of a political than an intelligence purpose. A Pentagon official is cited in the* New York Times *story today saying your testimony this morning, that the changes involved in going public, approved by the White House, "was designed to muster popular support for the President's embattled military budget." My question is: Is this an appropriate role for you to play and does it compromise the CIA's credibility to get dragged into the controversy over the size of the defense budget?*
>
> Stevens: *With due respect, senator, I asked them to come and gave them an invitation as to what we wanted them to talk about.*
>
> Proxmire: *Absolutely, there is no question the CIA is responding properly to your request. The request, itself, seems to have*

Robert Gates (left) presents a certificate to Larry Gershwin in this autographed, undated photograph from Dr. Gershwin's collection.

political implications since we have broken this out from a classified hearing to a public hearing. In the past these [hearings] *have been classified. So there is a change here…. What is your answer to that?*

Gates: *Senator Proxmire, I won't address the motives of the White House in this respect. I will tell you that this briefing has been given on a classified basis to a very large number of Members of Congress over the last several weeks. A large number of those who received the briefing here on the Hill asked if there wasn't some way that this information could be made available to the public. We were then asked by the White House if in fact we could be responsive to those requests, if we could provide a declassified version of our most recent assessment. Given the amount of material that had already been made available officially, we decided we could do that.*

We at this point, as professional intelligence officers, face something of a dilemma. We are fully aware of the dangers of a public presentation to the integrity and objectivity of our judgments on such subjects. At the same time we are aware so much of the information subject is incomplete and distorted as I indicated at the outset. We also recognized the value of making available on a broad basis a commonly agreed set of facts for discussion on Soviet strategic force development.

Likewise, Sen. Gary Hart (D-CO) asserted that "by bringing [intelligence] professionals before what is admittedly by all of us a political institution, we threaten to make partisan and even ideological what is central to this nation's security. I think there has been restraint this morning in doing that, but a pattern can be

Vital Role of NIEs in the Cold War

Then CIA chief historian Kay Oliver noted in her foreword to *Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950–1983* (CSI, 1996):

Intelligence Estimates on Soviet strategic forces drove the entire strategic analytical process within the American Intelligence Community and played a central role in the great strategic debates affecting US behavior throughout the Cold War. Controversy and analytical closure at the working level influenced debate and decision making at the policy level regarding arms control, force structure, resource allocation, military procurement, and contingency planning for war. Some regarded the Estimates as a battleground, while others used the Estimates as a bible; few of those concerned with Soviet strategic matters ignored the Estimates. They provided a foundation for official US public statements on Soviet military power and indirectly had a significant impact on the American population's understanding of the Soviet strategic threat as well….

Production of the strategic Estimates, usually on an annual basis, culminated an enormous collection, processing, and reporting enterprise that fed material and analysis to planners and policy makers day in and day out throughout the year. The regularity of the production schedule was a major strength of the strategic Estimates. The Estimate defined the problems that intelligence experts knew they would have to deal with over the coming year and influenced analytical and collection strategies.

established in which those who want to make a partisan or ideological point can do so."[a]

After all senators had completed questioning the witnesses, Stevens closed the hearing by stating, "I want to tell you that, in my judgment, you did not get any criticism for a sham presentation because you really did declassify some information here this morning and I think this has been a real step in the right direction. I am hoping we will have some ongoing dialogue about other areas that are currently classified that ought to be at least sanitized and presented to the public. I thank you and the total Intelligence Community for their cooperation in this regard." Warner echoed Stevens's summary, noting "I join in that and say you have conducted yourselves in a most professional manner."

With that, the groundbreaking hearing adjourned at 12:30 p.m. Gates and Gershwin had successfully completed more than two hours of open testimony and responded to wide-ranging questions posed by Republican and Democratic members of two key Senate subcommittees charged with overseeing US defense policy and spending.

Reporting on the Hearing

Not surprisingly, the unclassified public testimony of the two senior NIC officials attracted considerable coverage by US and foreign media outlets. The *Washington Post* wrote, "A top intelligence officer told a Senate hearing yesterday that the Soviet Union would increase the number of its nuclear missiles if unconstrained by the unratified SALT II treaty with the United States. The testimony of Lawrence K. Gershwin... conflicts with the views of SALT II critics in the Reagan Administration who express doubts that the Soviet Union would increase its nuclear warheads even if the treaty lapsed because Moscow already enjoys a large strategic edge over the United States."[b] The article also noted concerns expressed by Senators Proxmire and Hart about possible politicization of the intelligence process.

An unattributed Associated Press article stated that "the two officials... said there is strong evidence the Soviets are developing high-energy laser weapons. They estimated that the laser program is costing the Soviets $1 billion a year." It also noted, "Gershwin told the Senators that this year's intelligence estimates do not present 'any shocking new insight' but rather present evidence of continuing trends. Gershwin and Gates said the most notable trend in Soviet offensive forces is the construction of bases for mobile strategic missiles, including SS-20 medium-range weapons and new intercontinental ballistic missiles."[c]

Writing in the *Armed Forces Journal International,* Michael Ganley observed, "The Soviet Union

a. See David Robarge, "Interview with Former US Senator Gary Hart," *Studies in Intelligence* 65, no. 4 (*Extracts* – December 2021).
b. Michael Weisskopf, "Soviets Would Add Arms Without Treaty, Hill Told, Testimony Counters SALT's Critics," *Washington Post*, June 27, 1985.
c. Associated Press, "Soviets' nuclear arsenal improving, CIA testifies," *Minneapolis Star and Tribune*, June 27, 1985.

is on the brink of a massive expansion of its strategic nuclear offensive and defensive forces, according to a new intelligence estimate by the Central Intelligence Agency…. Some conservative Republican Senators, apparently frustrated by the Congressional slowdown of the Reagan Administration's military buildup, urged the White House to release the CIA report and let the CIA officials testify in open session about it…. Some Senate Democrats, however, complained that Republicans were playing 'partisan' politics with the intelligence assessment and damaging the CIA's credibility on Capitol Hill."[a]

Foreign news organizations—including state-directed media outlets—also reported on the hearing. For example, an *Izvestiya* commentary asserted "The CIA's present 'warnings,' compiled on White House orders, are not worth a plugged nickel either…. [T]his circumstance does not embarrass the administration. Misinformation serves its interests."[b]

China's news outlet Xinhua She stated, "Amidst the intensified disputes between Washington and Moscow over the unratified second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Reagan Administration today released a new report predicting the growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal in an apparent attempt to justify its own strategic arms expansion. The report, prepared by the US intelligence agencies and presented to a public hearing in the Senate, predicted a Soviet nuclear weapons building boom during the next 5 to 10 years as Moscow is well prepared for another round in the arms race despite domestic economic strain."[c]

Although concerns were expressed by several Democratic senators about possible politicization of the intelligence process, no one before, during, or after the hearing accused Gates or Gershwin or others in the IC of substantively altering the key judgments included in the original Top Secret version of the NIE.

Higher Profile

Some general observations regarding the overall impact of the hearing are warranted. First, the public testimony delivered by the two witnesses clearly raised the NIC's profile and stature. Gates and Gershwin demonstrated a high degree of professionalism and thorough subject matter knowledge and expertise, even when undergoing pointed questioning by the senators. They were careful to note where intelligence was weak and therefore the estimate was more speculative. They made clear the importance of protecting sensitive sources and methods by refusing to answer certain questions in an open setting (in some such cases they offered to provide classified responses through appropriate channels). Without a doubt, the hearing marked a major milestone in the NIC's history.

Second, fears of politicization of the IC were overblown. Although concerns were expressed by several Democratic senators about possible politicization of the intelligence process, no one before, during, or after the hearing accused Gates or Gershwin or others in the IC of substantively altering the key judgments included in the original Top Secret version of the NIE. Likewise, US press coverage raised concerns about possible politicization, but none accused the IC witnesses of reshaping the intelligence to fit a particular political line. In hindsight, the decision to focus on declassifying the NIE, rather than attempting to draft a new, unclassified report for public release, was a wise approach.

Conclusion

The Reagan administration's decision to declassify the NIE led to the unprecedented unclassified public testimony of senior NIC officials before two key Senate subcommittees with oversight responsibilities for US defense spending and policy. For Reagan, that decision entailed potential risks and rewards—risks in terms of accusations of politicizing the IC on such a sensitive topic as the Soviet strategic force developments and rewards in terms of generating greater political support in Congress and with the public for his proposed strategic modernization program.

In the end, the NIC produced a declassified version of the NIE untainted by political considerations, with powerful, enlightening testimony on a critically important

a. Michael Ganley, "CIA Sees Soviet Strategic Buildup, But Critics Slam Report's Release," *Armed Forces Journal International*, August 1985.
b. V. Soldatov, "Rejoinder: Misinformation to Order," *Izvestiya*, July 10, 1985.
c. "US Predicts Growth in Soviet Nuclear Arsenal," Xinhua She, June 27, 1985.

national security topic. Although one can debate whether the hearing changed minds in Congress on Reagan's strategic modernization program, there is no question that the hearing marked a major milestone in the distinguished history of the IC's seniormost analytic body, the National Intelligence Council.

The author is grateful to Dr. Lawrence K. Gershwin for his willingness to share materials, insights, and recollections about this landmark hearing.

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US Intelligence: Profession, Community, or Enterprise?

Bowman H. Miller

My contention is that intelligence is not one profession but rather a complex amalgam of multiple professions. To call it a single profession in and of itself shorts intelligence; it deprives it of the wide expanse and increasing depth of all it is asked to do and of the complicated, layered wherewithal to achieve its manifold objectives.

Is intelligence work a *profession*? The debate continues, in fits and starts, over whether and to what extent work in intelligence constitutes work within a profession. The exchange of views has been spirited at times, even occasionally acrimonious. It has a long history. In the discussion that follows, the aim is to sort out some of the pros and cons of the argument and to suggest a compromise solution that is, by many, already partially embraced.

Intelligence work is performed by huge numbers of professionals, be they part of something that warrants the designation "profession" or not. My contention is that intelligence is not one profession but rather a complex amalgam of multiple professions. To call it a single profession in and of itself shorts intelligence; it deprives it of the wide expanse and increasing depth of all it is asked to do and of the complicated, layered wherewithal to achieve its manifold objectives.

What Is Intelligence?

Defining intelligence has a lot to do with deciding its status as a profession or otherwise. Almost all definitions of it combine "what it is" with "what it does." To the many who work in government intelligence, it is largely secret information secretly acquired and zealously protected. Writing in 2002, Michael Warner defined it as "secret state activity to understand or influence foreign entities."[1] Today that version is too narrow. For one, secrecy is no longer a defining characteristic of intelligence. The increasing focus on and volume of open-source intelligence is evidence of that.[2] Just as governments have long since lost any monopoly on information they may have once enjoyed, the same holds for intelligence. Any consideration of the naming issue, therefore, must examine all facets and loci of intelligence, both in its public- and private-sector manifestations.

In his article "A New Definition of Intelligence," Alan Breakspear in 2013 offered a more accurate, relevant, and encompassing definitional proposition: "Intelligence is a corporate capability to forecast change in time to do something about it."[3] One advantage of this wider gauge is to subordinate the notions of intelligence being limited to "state" and "secret" undertakings. It also encompasses the ever-growing field of commercially conducted work. Major corporations employ staff to study and analyze political-economic conditions and outlooks in order to assess risk. (Breakspear's use of corporate simply refers to an institutional activity, be it official or in the private sector.)

In wording his definition in this way, Breakspear skirts the pitfalls of "secrecy" and "state-conducted."

The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.

Much of what has been written and debated about intelligence's candidacy as a profession tends to limit consideration to the field of analysis. As vital as analysis might be, it is but one of several elements.

He focuses on providing insights with which the receiving entity has the time and information to enable action. However, he does not give us a straighter path to answering the central question: Is intelligence a profession? That dilemma remains to be treated.

While some may see this naming issue as making a mountain out of a molehill, others believe that deciding that intelligence does not qualify to be called a profession would be both demeaning and shortsighted. That said, those doing intelligence do not need to meet a specific set of qualifications, as is typical of other professions. They do not need to meet standards set by an external authority. Nor do they need to be licensed, certified, or otherwise authorized to do their work and to be recognized as professionals.

Much of what has been written and debated about intelligence's candidacy as a profession tends to limit consideration to the field of analysis. As vital as analysis might be, it is but one of several elements. Depending on one's unique national or bureaucratic cultures or traditions, intelligence also comprises collection, counterintelligence, and covert action. The intelligence literature, which Sherman Kent called for at the creation of US intelligence, parses these distinctions. Some of them also mark differences between British and American practice.[4] However, when Stephen Marrin (now a full professor at James Madison University) in 2007 prescribed the required moves and ingredients that could transition analysis from a craft to a profession, the suggested solution appeared both partial and in some respects utopian.[5]

What Is a Profession?

Definitions of a profession vary widely but generally coalesce around the idea of a paid occupation with specialized education, training, knowledge, and ethics. That might make intelligence a profession. One council of professions offers a more detailed and specified definition,

> *By some modern definitions a profession is a disciplined group of individuals (professionals) who adhere to ethical standards and who hold themselves out as, and are accepted by the public as, possessing special knowledge and skills in a widely recognised body of learning derived from research, education and training at a high level, and who are prepared to apply this knowledge and exercise these skills in the interest of others.*[6]

Lists of professionals, rather than professions, likewise range far and wide. One website offers accountant, teacher, technician, laborer, physician, commercial banker, engineer, lawyer, psychologist, and more as examples.[7] Such an inventory of careers and job titles doesn't get us very far when contemplating whether work in intelligence is also work in a profession.

The military, among the most respected institutions in US society, is a profession. It is also a calling, one even labeled the manifestation of "true belief" in terms of Eric Hoffer's excursus on the nature of mass movements.[8] One of Hoffer's features is a shared ethos of members, also typical of intelligence professionals, many of whom are in uniform or are civilian officials or contractors working intelligence and national security tasks.

The Founders' Wisdom

Examining the views of the iconic Sherman Kent is a good place to start. In his essay highlighting "The Need for an Intelligence Literature," Kent recalled the 1941 inception of a US intelligence effort undertaken in wartime collaboration with the United Kingdom: "Intelligence was to us at that period really nothing in itself; it was, at best, the sum of what we, from our outside experience, could contribute to a job to be done. It did not have the attributes of a profession or a discipline or a calling." He added, "Today things are quite different."[9] The question that I ask is whether Kent's early claim is true and, if so, in what ways are things "quite different" than they were some 70 or more years ago.

Kent expanded upon his claim that intelligence, in his day and experience, had undergone profound changes,

> *Intelligence is more than an occupation, more than a livelihood, more than just another phase of government work. Intelligence has become, in our own recent memory, an exacting, highly skilled profession, and an honorable one. Before you can enter this profession, you must prove yourself possessed of native talent and you*

Intelligence Analysis: Craft or Profession?

In his essay "Intelligence Analysis: Turning a Craft into a Profession," (University of Virginia, 2007) Stephen Marrin (who today directs the intelligence studies program at James Madison University) went to some lengths to prescribe what intelligence needs to do, and how it must reform, to progress from craft to profession. Much of his prescription runs up against the reality of ingrained traditions, practices, and stipulations that impede such an ascent. Moreover, despite its importance, analysis is only one of several aspects of intelligence. Even were it deemed a "profession," that omits collection, counterintelligence, and covert action, at the very least. Thus, his attempted solution to this naming challenge remains partial and, from a practitioner perspective, a bit utopian. His attempt to force professionalizing of intelligence into the definitional requirements and boundaries of other, credentialed professions—in his case comparing it to medicine—appears to be trying to force a round peg into a square hole.

> *must bring to it some fairly rigorous pre-training. Our profession like older ones has its own rigid entrance requirements and, like others, offers areas of general competence and areas of very intense specialization.*[10]

Written nine years later about Allen Dulles's *The Craft of Intelligence*, Frank Wisner's eloquent review displays both keen insights into the intelligence world and some of its shortcomings. Wisner's assessment, however, features a lexical cacophony when it comes to characterizing intelligence. Wisner refers to intelligence variously as a craft, trade, profession, enterprise, and community. He inserts pointedly one key observation he attributes to Dulles: "Intelligence is probably the least understood and the most misrepresented of the professions."[11]

Speaking about the same issue to portions of the then Defense Intelligence School (DIS) in 1981, its head, Navy Capt. Richard W. Bates, focused on the issue of intelligence as a profession. He laid out his objectives for the DIS in this context.

> *The goal was to contribute to the recognition of military intelligence as a profession by establishing or identifying the recognized elements of a profession, including: Academic degree programs, a supporting body of literature, a professional journal, a professional association, a code of ethics, a vehicle for national recognition of experts and authorities, and a viable and dynamic academic research capability.*[12]

It would appear, at first glance, that the vast majority of Bates's aims in terms of intelligence qualifying as a profession are now in hand. But there is more to the story.

Intelligence—Beyond Government Secrecy

Almost all intelligence definitions mix "what it is" with a heavy dose of "what it does." For decades intelligence was understood to be secret information secretly obtained and utilized. Writing 40 years ago, George Allen could assert that because "intelligence is a state monopoly, the function is performed only in the service of the state."[13] Twenty years later the scene had not changed appreciably when Michael Warner defined intelligence as "secret state activity to understand or influence foreign entities."[14] Again, Warner's version today is too narrow. For one, secrecy is not now a defining characteristic of intelligence. Open-source information, much of which can qualify and be usefully exploited as intelligence, has been a bedrock of US intelligence going back to Kent's day. It is also corporate intelligence's bread and butter. Nonetheless, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)'s current definition reads as follows:

> *Intelligence is information gathered within or outside the U.S. that involves threats to our nation, its people, property, or interests; development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; and any other matter bearing on the U.S. national or homeland security.*[15]

Intelligence, however, is no longer limited to governments trying to read one another's mail. Rather, intelligence is a widespread activity in business and industry, and it is also a business in and of itself. Commercial entities and nonstate actors are very much part of the activity now. Private companies acquire and sell intelligence—and analysis—to corporations to assess risk, protect and/or obtain technology, acquire proprietary data, and more.

Comparable Professions

What does the business of doing intelligence have in common with fields like medicine, dentistry, law, engineering, social work, the military, and the like? Do those in intelligence, like these others, need to demonstrate a certain, testable level of competency in an area of knowledge or

In all of its complexity, intelligence fails any attempt to force it into the constraints of comprising a single, stand-alone profession. Such a label is both insufficient and inappropriate.

practice? Do they need specialized certification, licensing, or credentialing to perform their work and do they need to receive validation of expertise from some higher, external governing authority? Maintaining credentials does not require periodic testing or recertification updating. One can have a degree in law but, in order to be admitted to practice law, one must pass professionally administered bar exams. One cannot legally practice medicine without undergoing internships, residencies, and medical board exams overseen by state authorities. Medicine, law, and such tend to be learned, often high-paying and status-laden professions.

In all of its complexity, intelligence fails any attempt to force it into the constraints of comprising a single, stand-alone profession. Such a label is both insufficient and inappropriate. The scope of intelligence's missions and tasks is monumental. The fact is that intelligence is not one profession but rather an assemblage of a range of other professions. It includes analysts, collectors, scientists, physicians, engineers, attorneys, computer specialists, accountants, technicians, educators, and more. "Members of the profession include not only those employing skills unique to intelligence work, but also those using skills primarily of other disciplines within the bureaucratic framework of intelligence organizations."[16]

What about skilled specialists like plumbers, electricians, construction contractors, and automobile mechanics, all of whom can be found in the IC. Are these crafts, in the standard sense of an activity making things by hand? The term hardly seems appropriate to describe intelligence writ large, although there are craftspeople performing intelligence missions, like building models or concealment devices. Skilled trades command increasing respect and pay, generally advertise that they are "licensed, bonded, and insured," and require more sophisticated training and expertise, especially in advanced technology. But are they also professions? I leave that question open.

One thing these trades often share with professions is the tendency to earn and showcase evidence of their qualifications, board examinations, awards, medals, commemorations of promotion, and records of service longevity. These seek to convince clients of expertise and value for costs incurred. In an automobile service center, one can encounter visible evidence of the presence of factory-trained and -certified technicians, much like a diploma displayed in a law or medical office.

Intelligence and Tradecraft

Part of what complicates extricating the world of intelligence from competing naming practices is its convoluted, evolving lexicon. The element of intelligence engaged in collection, principally using recruited and handled foreign human sources, refers to its behavior, techniques, and practices as "tradecraft." That term fails to adequately and appropriately describe the multi-faceted work of analysis. Rather, analysis demands and uses methodologies, not tradecraft, despite the effort to migrate the lexicon of collection into analysis (see earlier textbox).

Knowledge and Service

Those who toil in the exacting, challenging, often thankless work of intelligence are, for the most part, professionals, whether in an acknowledged profession or not. They come to their work with specialties, expertise, and academic and other credentials related or applicable to what they pursue and perform. However, we use the name "professional" in several different, often imprecise ways. Athletes who play sports for money are professionals, as distinguished from amateurs. Thus, professional baseball qualifies as such based on the level of play, the size of the stadiums or ballparks, ticket prices, league standings, and championships. This is merely one illustration of the fact that one can, indeed, have professionals without insisting they are also part of a profession.

More and more students in universities now study intelligence, but are they preparing themselves for work in a profession? Is work in intelligence a vocation but not yet, and perhaps never to be, a profession in and of itself? Is it, or is its analysis component by itself, a profession versus a craft? "What does it matter?" you may ask, but the answer is not superfluous. "Profession" carries with it inclusion in a select grouping of endeavors, some notion of elevated status, and recognition of special skills, knowledge, and understanding.

There is an expanding body of intelligence research and literature, a growing number of peer-reviewed

and specialized intelligence journals, international and national learned societies, and subsets of larger scholarly bodies focused on intelligence. For example, the International Studies Association features an intelligence element. One key aspect of that growing body of literature is the CIA-managed *Studies in Intelligence*, in print since 1955. Its former subtitle—"The Journal of the American Intelligence Professional"—echoes Kent's call for an intelligence literature.[17] Other leading journals in this same vein include *Intelligence and National Security* and the *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*.

Intelligence, like more traditional professions, serves a purpose to benefit the common good, even if the evidence of that often remains cloaked in secrecy. The hidden nature of intelligence's work makes it harder to argue for the use of profession. Unfortunately, the outsider's picture of intelligence is often fraught with heroic fictionalization on the one hand and disparagement of its assumed malpractice on the other. Admission and acceptance into the government's intelligence world requires a qualifying judgment as to one's suitability and sworn fidelity to an oath of secrecy and non-disclosure. However, no overarching external authority beyond the intelligence community acts as the decisionmaking body to admit and clear candidates.

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US Intelligence Academy

The IC draws, in part, on graduates of universities with programs in intelligence studies, but it also has its own academy in the National Intelligence University. NIU is governed by a board of visitors operating under the purview of the DNI. Given NIU's unique authority and ability to conduct intelligence studies in a classified environment, it alone educates intelligence and national security professionals with a unique breadth of classified, sensitive access. Most of NIU's students come with practical experience in some facet of intelligence or its application, which the NIU programs of study endeavor to expand and strengthen. NIU offers fully accredited bachelor's and master's degrees, fulfilling one of the characteristics Captain Bates included in his 1981 wishlist.

NIU has long pondered whether and how one might create and validate a doctoral degree program in intelligence. What would it entail? What would the essential components be in order to authenticate a Ph.D.-level of intelligence competence and knowledge? Would the "study of intelligence" beyond a master's degree be similar to getting an Ed.D.? How would a doctoral student in intelligence perform the study of processes, history, case studies, analytic challenges, and organizational behavior that does not reside equally within a university's history, political science, international relations, hard sciences, or business departments and career fields? This harkens back to Kent's early description of the mixed makeup and backgrounds of those brought together in the wartime OSS.

Intelligence educators at the US college or university level—be those institutions private, public, or NIU itself—come in three varieties. Professors of practice draw on years of practical intelligence experience. Academics generally lack that direct involvement and experience. Hybrid educators bring a blend of both. The subset of academics in intelligence higher education also has an international organization in the International Association for Intelligence Education. Another professional society in the intelligence realm more broadly is the Intelligence and National Security Alliance, bringing together specialists in industry with those in goverment ranks. These organizations, and others like them, foster crosspollination, coordinated research, improvements in pedagogy, and expanded intelligence inquiry. Their membership tends to be international and they furnish another piece of evidence arguing for intelligence as a profession.

Intelligence as a Community

If intelligence is not actually a single profession, as I suggest, is part of that argument the fact that the US intelligence agencies also claim to form a community? What is the reality behind the expression "intelligence community"? Some would argue that, given the various shortcomings in a true community of intelligence, the IC moniker should not even warrant capital letters. In short, the IC is the amalgam of some 18 different agencies and services. Variously they perform a wide range of intelligence functions serving a host of purposes and clients, from the president to a platoon leader.

To some extent the separate agencies or services fall under the purview

"Community" also implies a basic inclination to share perspectives, bear common burdens, and exchange views across divides.

of the DNI, or under the Secretary of Defense. Still others are departmental units within the Departments of Treasury, Energy, State, Homeland Security, and Justice. Community oversight, once centered under the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), now resides in large part (but without day-to-day direction or budgetary authorities) under the presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed DNI.

The term "intelligence community" was first used during DCI Bedell Smith's tenure (1950–53). The IC was officially established by Executive Order 12333, signed by President Reagan on December 4, 1981. The crux of the question concerning the viability and reality of the "community" of US intelligence efforts lies in assessing the accuracy of the stipulations, laid out in the 2008 update to E.O. 12333, that the DNI "will lead a unified, coordinated, and effective intelligence effort."

Views vary widely on how readily and completely that mandate is being or can be met. The dilemma of breaking through often impenetrable stovepipes between agencies and activities remains alive; it accounts in no small part for some devastating intelligence failures and interagency, internecine bureaucratic warfare.[18] While interagency coordination and collaborative analysis have improved over time and under pressure to do so, individual agencies and their leaderships remain fiefdoms jealous of their access to particular kinds of intelligence and specific clients. Herding cats is, perhaps, not the most apt or original metaphor for this challenge facing any DNI to be sure, but it is also not far from the truth. The mere size, dispersal, and multiplicity of efforts of the IC make a DNI's work, regardless of staff size and leverage, a daunting task. No one person or oversight mechanism can possibly have continual managerial oversight of all of what US intelligence does globally day in and day out.

"Community" also implies a basic inclination to share perspectives, bear common burdens, and exchange views across divides. There are, of course, some functional structures in US national intelligence that are explicitly designed and designated to do just that. National intelligence officers (NIOs) and national intelligence managers (NIMs) are tasked with such national-level coordination and production of intelligence. NIOs focus on providing intelligence independently and via the National Intelligence Council to the President and senior executive branch leaders.[19] NIMs were instituted to manage both IC-wide targeting and collection, as well as related analysis focused on specific regions, rival states, threatening phenomena like nuclear proliferation and terrorism, and more. In both cases, cognizance of what the IC is doing, could do, and might do is fundamental to success in achieving cooperation and joint endeavor.

Intelligence as an Enterprise

The most recent lexical entry in the evolving definition of intelligence is the concept of intelligence as an "enterprise." If "community" derives from the world of societal notions, "enterprise" finds it antecedents and cousins in business and industry. The name in standard usage can range from a car rental company to a fictional starship, but it generally depicts a set of institutions and activities dedicated to a common purpose or product. In IC terms, the use of "enterprise" tends to refer to the totality of the US intelligence agencies' human resources, capabilities, outcomes, and assessments.

Listings online that use the precise terminology of "intelligence enterprise" appear only with reference to the Department of Homeland Security and the US Coast Guard. Those are their preferred terms for their in-house intelligence activities that, taken together, comprise the set of intelligence activities of those organizations as a whole. In a larger context, the Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) has entered the institutional lexicon, marrying the Defense Intelligence Agency and the service intelligence elements. In the *Defense Intelligence Enterprise Capstone Guide 2010,* then Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence James Clapper described the DIE as a consortium of organizations under USD(I) that

> *assures success in meeting the challenges of identifying and assessing a wide range of threats to DoD and the nation. The Enterprise helps protect our nation by providing timely, accurate intelligence that supports activities ranging from military operations to weapons acquisitions and to policy deliberations.*

The current director of DIA used the term several times in his annual unclassified threat testimony with

the DNI before the Senate Armed Services Committee in May 2023.

Taking a different tack and wider perspective, Harvard University intelligence fellow Dr. Sunny Singh argued as follows:

> *To understand the US intelligence community and the* [then] *seventeen components comprising it, one must study the collective as an enterprise that gathers intelligence, conducts all-source, non-policy prescriptive and objective analysis which it disseminates and briefs to policymakers. The underlying force behind the intelligence enterprise consists of three parts; its workforce, the private firms that support that workforce through intelligence-driven contracts and the context upon which these two interplay.*[20]

Conclusion

I set out in this discussion to appraise the appropriateness and accuracy of referring to intelligence work as a "profession". It clearly has some of the major features of other acknowledged professions, from a specialized literature and dedicated knowledge societies to a basic code of ethics and a broad assemblage of knowledge, skills and abilities. At the same time, there is today a world of intelligence also outside of government. Secrecy is not its all-defining characteristic, and the scope and missions of US intelligence are vast and ever-expanding. Calling that huge "enterprise" one profession does not do it justice.

The holy grail of being defined and seen as a "profession" remains a worthy goal, even if not yet fully attained. Thus, we come back to the initial proposition, i.e., that intelligence cannot be reduced to one "profession" but rather is an amalgam of many professions. And Breakspear's definition of intelligence remains one of the more appropriate: "Intelligence is a corporate capability to forecast change in time to do something about it." With or without the "profession" designation, US intelligence can claim a rich history and continuing record of highly valued, attested professionalism in support of national security.

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11. Frank Wisner, review of On the Craft of Intelligence, by Allen Dulles, Studies in Intelligence (Winter 1964), 28.
12. Richard Bates, excerpted from "Remarks to the Reserve Symposium on Strategic Intelligence at the Defense Intelligence School," July 17, 1981.
13. George Allen, "The Professionalization of Intelligence," Studies in Intelligence 26, no. 1 (Spring 1982), 28.
14. Warner, 13.
15. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/what-is-intelligence, accessed November 28, 2022.
16. Allen, 29.
17. The Studies cover was redesigned for the first issue of 2023 and no longer includes the subtitle.
18. See Amy Zegart, Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence (Princeton University Press, 2022).
19. See Robert Hutchings and Gregory Treverton, eds., Truth to Power: A History of the National Intelligence Council (Oxford University Press, 2019).
20. Sunny J. Singh, The U.S. Intelligence Enterprise and the Role of Privatizing Intelligence, Occasional Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University Kennedy School (September 2019).

Transformational Learning Theory and Alternatives to Obstacles in the Development of Intelligence Professionals

Steven G. Shenouda, Ph.D., Debra L. Lieberman, Ph.D., Michael J. Beatty, Ph.D., Craigory M. Brown, M.B.A., Scott W. Atherton, J.D., followed by response from Dr. Julie Mendosa

Editor's Note: Studies *is committed to professional and substantive debate on issues relevant to the intelligence practitioner. In this commentary, Steven Shenouda, et al., offer a critique of Dr. Julie Mendosa's article, "Transformational Learning for Intelligence Professionals"* (Studies in Intelligence *66, no. 3 (September 2022), which explored how students at the National Intelligence University make meaning and suggested that intelligence organizations should create developmental cultures by providing opportunities for discourse, collaboration, and sharing. We include Dr. Mendosa's response and a rebuttal by Shenouda, et al. Developing new knowledge is integral to* Studies*' mission, and we invite readers' comments on any article or media review.*

In her September 2022 article, Dr. Julie Mendosa seeks to understand how students learn at the National Intelligence University (NIU) and puts forward that they should be able to think autonomously and adaptively with concrete and abstract thinking abilities. Mendosa reports, albeit from a severely underpowered study in which only a few subjects completed the retest questionnaire, that there appears to be more concrete, rules-based thinking than independent abstract thinking on campus.

But there are many problems with Dr. Mendosa's study. For instance, there are methodological problems with test/retest protocols. Without proper controls, internal validity is compromised, making it impossible to determine whether observed changes are due to the experimental condition or to one of the other possible sources of change, including maturation effects, history effects, regression to the mean, and experimenter bias. Furthermore, conceptual and theoretical issues limit the application of Mendosa's findings. For these reasons, and because she did not include an adequate control, causal inferences are tenuous at best, and therefore caution should be taken when considering the application of Transformational Learning Theory in the IC or NIU.

Compromised Internal Validity

Student responses and the changes in them perceived by Mendosa could easily have occurred without NIU experience. Mendosa's study falls short of demonstrating that students' answers to the protocol questions and the purported changes were in fact due to the NIU experience. Unfortunately, Mendosa collected responses from one group of students at two points in time. In the methodological literature, this approach to data collection is known as a one-group pretest-posttest design, which Campbell and Stanley (1963) in their now classic analysis of research designs used for assessment of higher education outcomes, referred to as a "bad example" (7).

The problem is that factors other than NIU experience are capable of producing the same responses observed by Mendosa, which also means that the same outcomes might be observed in students enrolled somewhere other than NIU. Research findings cannot be trusted if the design used to collect data lacks internal validity, and therefore, curricula ought not be built on them. Internal validity depends on the extent to which treatments, conditions, or programs to which participants are exposed are in fact responsible for the observed outcomes. As Campbell and Stanley remind us, internal validity is "the basic minimum without which any experiment is uninterpretable." (7) One-group pretest-posttest designs fall short on the

The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.

criterion of internal validity for at least four important reasons, meaning that Mendosa's study cannot be taken as evidence regarding anything about the NIU experience.

First, the administration of a pretest produces changes in behavior and cognition in study participants even when treatments or programs have no independent effect. Campbell and Stanley point out that "on achievement and intelligence tests, students taking the test for a second time, or taking an alternative form of the test, etc., usually do better than students taking the test for the first time… these effects…occur without any instruction." (9) Indeed, reviews of research conducted over 50 years ago underscore the numerous ways in which pretesting affects outcomes. (Lana, 1966) The Solomon four-group design was proposed so that pretest effects can be detected. (Campbell & Stanley, 1963) It is impossible to separate pretest effects from NIU experience effects in Dr. Mendosa's study.

Second, the one-group pretest-posttest design is particularly susceptible to history effects, meaning that some event occurring between the pretest and the posttest other than NIU experience was actually responsible for the observed outcomes. Imagine, for example, that graduate students enrolled in an advanced statistics course are confused and anxious because the instructor is an ineffective lecturer. In response, the students locate and master a set of online advanced statistics learning modules. The students then make As on the exam. Clearly in this example, student performance on the exam was not due to the instructor; the students' extracurricular online adventure constitutes a history effect. Control groups are used in research precisely to detect history effects. Unfortunately, Mendosa failed to include appropriate control groups.

Third, biological and psychological processes such as being more or less hungry, bored, tired, motivated, anxious and stressed, etc., typically vary across time and can affect participant responses to protocol materials. Campbell and Stanley refer to these factors as maturation effects. Thus, for example, if NIU students were more anxious and stressed about the novelty of attending NIU during Time 1 but habituated to the environment and the culture later in the semester, more in depth and sophisticated responses could be expected during Time 2 because of the reduction in stress and anxiety that occurs with familiarity of the environment.

Last, changes in the coding and categorization of data produced by human observers can result in differences in pretest and posttest scores if coders' biological and psychological processes change from pretest to posttest. In this way, changes from pretest to posttest could reflect changes in Mendosa rather than changes in the students, a conclusion contrary to her intent. (For example, Mendosa could have become an easier grader between Time 1 and Time 2.) Among behavioral and social-science researchers, there is general agreement that a panel of independent coders, blind to the hypotheses of the study if not the purpose of the study, should be used to code data so that the reliability of measurement can be calculated.

Before important decisions about program content and pedagogical practice are based on research, it is critical that findings and conclusions from that research are generalizable beyond one coder's subjective evaluation, especially if those findings happen to support the coder's ideological or theoretical preference. However, the reliability and validity of Mendosa's perceptions of the themes embedded in student responses remain a matter for speculation.

In sum, it is possible for any or all of the threats to internal validity to have occurred in Mendosa's study, but it is impossible to detect those threats within a one-group pretest-posttest design. A serious assessment of learning outcomes requires that a valid research design is used to gather data consisting of measures of known psychometric qualities such as reliability and validity. Basing educational and training materials on research findings by seriously flawed research designs and relying on measures of undemonstrated quality is nothing short of a recipe for disappointment, especially if the students who opted out of the study (about half of those initially contacted) respond differently to NIU than to the study volunteers. (For research regarding the differences between volunteer and non-volunteer study participants, see, Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1966.)

Cognition and Learning Models

Mendosa suggests that a Transformational Learning approach can lead to better learning outcomes, given specific intelligence professionals' requirements for skillsets/tradecraft. While Mendosa's efforts and goals are laudable, it is unclear that a Transformational Learning approach is an appropriate approach, because, in addition to the methodological errors in Mendosa's study, it is important to note that domain-general theories of human

cognition and learning, like this one, are, by their nature, much weaker at explaining and, therefore, predicting or shaping any specific human behavior.

Educational decision makers searching for an empirically supported instructional program should first note that the social and behavior sciences are dominated by theories (like TLT) and models that lack conceptual integration, that are often based on patent falsehoods, and championed by faculty at even the most prestigious universities. (Lieberman and Shenouda, 2022) This is due mostly to a paucity of sound interdisciplinary training in education at all levels, resulting in an over-reliance on folk intuitions to guide scientific questions, particularly those that relate to human thinking and decisionmaking.

The matter is compounded by researchers studying the wave tops of human behavior, examining what appears to be evident—as opposed to the biological information-processing architecture beneath the surface. Without an accurate theory and model of how the brain and behavior work, attempting to augment intelligence professionals' competence will be merely a haphazard endeavor. Without explicitly searching below the wave tops when considering human behavior, to identify and recalibrate the underlying architecture (in this case in relation to mission requirements) researchers take the path of least resistance and rely on intuitions to inform the unseen—the below the surface—leading us to make poor inferences. And when world-renowned academics succumb to these intuitions, correcting them can be difficult given the coalition politics of academic publishing.

Transformational Learning Theory was developed to understand how women entering university as adults best learn and is therefore not a comprehensive theory best able to aid the IC in understanding, predicting, or shaping human activity. According to Jack Mezirow (2003), "Transformative learning is learning that transforms problematic frames of reference—sets of fixed assumptions and expectations (habits of mind, meaning perspectives, mindsets)—to make them more inclusive, discriminating, open, reflective, and emotionally able to change." (58, Mezirow, 2003) At its core, TLT is a theory that advocates a simplistic, dualistic approach to human nature (see Pinker, 2003). TLT and its kin are useful insofar as they identify that all humans come to a situation with their own experiences and "frames of reference." Beyond this obvious realization, such theories hold little value as comprehensive learning theories for understanding the internal procedures that enable and pattern "learning" and that influence human behavior.

What is needed is a model that sidesteps the offering of merely another set of dichotomous labels and provides a framework for understanding why a system (e.g., competence, behavior, emotion) exists, what its information-processing structure is, including the optimal range of inputs the system accepts, and how it develops and individually varies within and across cultures.

Instead of utilizing well-worn labels (e.g., nature versus nurture; innate versus learned; biology versus culture), TLT merely uses alternative dichotomous labels, namely the terminology of instrumental processes (characterized as being closed, genetically determined, and inflexible) versus communicative processes (characterized as being open, culturally unbounded, and flexible). It is important to note that TLT focuses purely on the latter, the discourse and communicative side of "knowing." Accordingly, TLT emphasizes the non-objectivity of knowledge, suggesting there is no basic framework for understanding human nature. But, just as biologists will attest that there exists such thing as spider nature, lion nature, and chimp nature, there is indeed such thing as human nature, replete with cultural artifacts and formal language.

We suggest there is much to be gained by starting with a conceptually integrated framework for understanding why a system exists, what its information-processing structure is, and how it develops and, in tandem, much to be gained by avoiding alternate frameworks where the whys, whats, and hows are inconsistent.

In sum, a biologically informed view of human nature provides a more enriched model of human cognition and learning than does TLT. The present state of the field suggests the mind contains rich structures of knowledge for understanding the physical, biological, and social domains. Learning, or more appropriately, calibration, is required in each domain. What this means is that learning, rather than being the explanation, is, in a conceptually integrated framework, an umbrella term for the functionally specialized systems that gather and integrate particular sets of information in a manner that is then used to make judgments and decisions in adaptive ways. Such a framework can be of great benefit to the IC.

Conclusions

Given as much, we offer suggestions for how to augment curricula to enhance autonomous and abstract independent thinking among graduating intelligence personnel at NIU. A larger downstream aim might be to reconcile IC-specific structural requirements (emanating from compartmentalization imperatives) and the subsequent stove-piping culture this creates, with the need for information-sharing and collaboration, given the critical nature of the broader IC mission.

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Dr. Mendosa Responds

The critique by Shenouda, Lieberman, Beatty, Brown, and Atherton of my article applies inappropriate standards to the research in my study and discounts the theoretical framework based on apparent personal preference rather than knowledge of the theory.

The first section of the critique, "Compromised Internal Validity," applies quantitative research expectations to the qualitative study. Yet the study was conducted from a clearly stated and described perspective within a robust qualitative social science research tradition.[a] The study rigorously followed the recommended procedures within this research tradition. Further, Shenouda, et al. find fault with the use of a questionnaire used at Time I and Time II. They erroneously call it a pretest and post-test, and appear to believe it was meant to assess NIU students' proficiency in meeting curricular learning outcomes. It was not. The purpose of the questionnaire was clearly stated in the article:

> *A questionnaire collected short answers to questions related to the students and their workplaces that were designed to draw out indications of how students made meaning.*

The study was about how the participants made meaning.

Shenouda et al., would have valid procedural and causal concerns if the study had claimed to be measuring or testing causal relationships, had stated the findings were generalizable beyond the participants in the study, or meant to assess student performance of learning outcomes. But it did not.

The second section of the critique, "Cognition and Learning Models," discounts the theoretical framework of the study, cognitive developmental theory from within the Transformative Learning Theory framework. Shenouda, et al. favor cognitive or biological-based research of human behavior, learning, and, apparently, all of human nature. The critique seems to say human learning must be studied via biological processes and not by intuition (apparently meaning interpretive research methods and theories built from such methods).

Additionally, the critique discounts the transformational learning theoretical framework without demonstrating any recent familiarity with it. But the critique does contain outright insulting language (without citations) about theories and researchers that come from traditions other than Shenouda, et al.'s stated predictive and determinant scientific preferences. The critique apparently encompasses much of the qualitative interpretive tradition in scholarship, which would be a bit much to rebut here. But a reasonable proposal can be made: humans and our learning are best understood with a variety of research approaches from many scholarly traditions. Certainly we have room to learn about humans, as this study did, by asking them what's on their minds.[b]

In summary, the bottom line might simply be that Shenouda, et al. don't like qualitative interpretive research or theoretical frameworks that fail to make definitive pronouncements. The study only proposed to offer something to think about, which is a valuable invitation for many *Studies in Intelligence* readers. The study itself might appeal more to conceptual, abstract, and adaptive forms of thinking than to concrete, black-and-white thinking.[c] Shenouda, et al. could have saved us all a lot of valuable time by simply agreeing among themselves: "Gee, we really don't like this kind of research." Though curiously enough, Shenouda, et al. make a parting recommendation that looks very much like a recommendation in the study: they suggest breaking down stove-piping cultures in the Intelligence Community to allow information-sharing and collaboration. This is very similar to the study's recommendation that intelligence organizations should create developmental cultures by providing opportunities for intelligence professionals to have discourse, collaborate, and share ideas.

a. J. W. Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches,* 3rd ed. (Sage, 2013); J. A. Maxwell, *Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach* (Sage, 2013); S. Merriam and E. Tisdell, *Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and Implementation,* 4th ed. (Jossey-Bass, 2016).

b. See inter alia P. Dominicé, *Learning from Our Lives: Using Educational Biographies with Adults* (Jossey-Bass, 2000); E. Drago-Severson and J. Blum-DeStefano, *Tell Me So I Can Hear You: A Developmental Approach to Feedback for Educators* (Harvard Education Press, 2016); C. Moustakas, *Phenomenological Research Methods* (Sage, 1994); C. K. Riessman, *Narrative Methods for the Human Sciences* (Sage, 2008); I. Seidman, *Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in Education & the Social Sciences*, 4th ed. (Teacher's College Press, 2013)..

c. E. Drago-Severson, *Becoming Adult Learners: Principles and Practices for Effective Development* (Teachers College Press, 2004); E. Drago-Severson and J. Blum-DeStefano.

Rebuttal to Dr. Mendosa

Dr. Mendosa's response to Shenouda, et al.'s commentary on her original article, *Transformational Learning for Intelligence Professionals*, attempts to frame our critique of her work as being based on "apparent personal preference rather than knowledge of the theory," while, as stratagem, presenting false dichotomies between quantitative and qualitative methods for artifice in contrasting approaches, merely for sake of constructing sanctuary.

As an initial matter, there is no distinction between research standards and expectations in qualitative or quantitative traditions. Factors impacting both quantitative and qualitative research studies do not discriminate by research approach. Indeed, factors such as history effects, maturation effects, experimenter bias, and regression to the mean can be equally damaging to the internal validity of qualitative or quantitative research studies, alike. Our focus is on validity of approach, collection, analysis and conclusion—independent of theory choice.

Mendosa's use of "research tradition" as subterfuge for defending unreliable results is regrettable. Firstly, there is no quantitative research without qualitative perspicacity because if one is not well-versed in how to consider high context matters, framing any quantitative approach is impossible, save improbable luck. Second, our author group members, ironically, are trained in and have extensive experience in conducting and publishing valid qualitative research, teaching qualitative methods to Ph.D. candidates, business students, and law students. We also have a remarkable number of years of well-compensated practitioner experience in mentoring juniors in academia, military operations, business operations, and the law—in addition to our credentialing in quantitative methods. We are, characteristically, interdisciplinary and diverse bunch.

We do unapologetically champion standards-based approaches to drawing conclusions that could influence or inform any knowledge base, scientific, personal, or professional. We take special care when considering the national security—and in this case decisionmaking as it might relate to the training and education of intelligence officers. We take issue with Mendosa's implication that a well-intended peer review on an issue of significant consequence would be derived from an aversion to qualitative research, or other personal preference, but properly contextualize her quip as merely academic sniping.

Appropriately considered, the thrust of our critique emanates from observed flaws in Mendosa's research design (independent of theoretical framework, even if it were, arguing inuendo, improperly understood). The flaws, being fatal in nature, unfortunately (i) call into question Mendosa's study's results, and (ii) invalidate any recommendations that would be predicated thereupon. Mendosa's flawed data collection and analysis design betrays the fidelity of any subsequent recommendations that could follow, independent of the soundness or flaws of Transformational Learning Theory (TLT) as a theoretical framework, even though Mendosa purports in her response not to make generalizable recommendations.

Notwithstanding this, Mendosa tells us in her response that "Shenouda et al., would have valid procedural and causal concerns if the study had [stated findings that] were generalizable beyond the participants in the study." But Mendosa does in fact makes numerous recommendations "for intelligence professionals," for starters, even by virtue of her article's title. Mendosa declares that "Intelligence organizations must train, educate, and structure themselves to move beyond the traditional mechanistic views of leaders as people who occupy high-level positions and implement the will of the organization," (25) explicitly offering recommendations that potentially implicate the national security apparatus, with no explanation as to where these recommendations come from, or how they are linked to the results of her research.

While Mendosa claims in her response that she does not attempt to draw causal inferences between TLT and her research conclusions, on page 25 of her original piece she calls out her students' growth between Time 1 and Time 2 of administering her test questionnaires, asserting that TLT is responsible for explaining such growth. There is no way to tease this conclusion apart from one founded in fact and theoretically grounded, or from or one stemming from simple experimenter interpretive bias. In the conclusion of her original article, Mendosa also states that "[T]hese patterns could potentially have relevance to intelligence professionals beyond the individuals sampled here" (Mendosa, 25). We do not know of any research tradition or profession in which the making of recommendations based on observations of one kind or another are not efforts to prescribe in generalization.

Conclusion

In his seminal work, *The Philosophy of Social Science,* Richard S. Rudner explains that "gaining knowledge" takes place within two contexts, the context of discovery and the context of validation. Rudner explains that the context of discovery is akin to qualitative research, encapsulating intuition, philosophy, and personal experience to gather information. However, Rudner goes on to suggest that information can only become knowledge through the process of validation, which requires controlling for threats to validity. In failing to implement necessary controls that curb such threats, Mendosa's study has fallen short.

Our group's response is an invitation for Mendosa to validate her study via a contemporary, mixed methods approach that encompasses both qualitative and quantitative methods. Because regardless of research tradition, a glaring question remains—do we want decisions affecting our intelligence officers and national security organizations to be guided by validated scientific results, or merely by something to think about?

From the **Studies** *Archive*

A Basic Tension: Openess and Secrecy

David D. Gries

Editor's note: We have reprinted this commentary to take note of the thinking of the late David Gries, who was the director of CSI during 1992–94, a time when CSI and CIA's Information and Management Staff were beginning to undertake a wide-ranging and intense effort to compile, review, and declassify historical intelligence materials from the Cold War. The early result was modest, but soon after Dave retired, the trickle had turned into a considerable flow of material published during the mid- and late 1990s on CSI's "Books and Monographs" site and the Freedom of Information site's historical collections section. This article originally appeared in Studies *37, no. 1 (1993); it was made publicly available in the second unclassified collection of* Studies *articles published in 1994. Gries passed away April 4, 2023, age 90.*

The American system of government is rooted in openness. Article I of the Constitution provides that "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same" and that "a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published" by the government. When combined with First Amendment guarantees of a free press, these provisions created the basis for open government. The Founding Fathers believed that openness was vital because the Colonies' disputes with the government of King George III taught them that participation of the governed could succeed only if the governed were well informed.

Throughout their history, Americans have relied on free elections. Congressional hearings and investigations, speeches and appearances by executive branch officials, and an inquiring press to make good on the Founding Fathers' promise of open government. Until the start of World War II, Congress and the executive branch openly debated most foreign affairs issues, and the press reported the results. Information about the small standing army was readily available both to Americans and to foreign representatives.

This system worked well until World War II brought the need to keep military plans and the capabilities of weapon systems from enemy eyes. Although Article I of the Constitution permitted Congress to withhold such records "as may in their Judgment require Secrecy," little of this occurred until the war started.

As the war progressed and our national security was threatened, breakthroughs in jet-engine technology, radar, sonar, rocketry, and atomic weapons required special protection. Openness in operations of the legislative and executive branches, previously the guarantors of the Founding Fathers' promise, was sharply curtailed.

Elaborate systems were devised to ensure secrecy, not only for spectacular achievements like reading German and Japanese wartime codes, but also for daily activities of the foreign affairs, intelligence, and military components of government. With the advent of the Cold War, conflict between the old tradition of openness and the new requirement for secrecy became a significant issue.

This conflict continues. According to the President's Information Security Oversight Office, in 1981, at the height of the Cold War, US Government officials were making more than 10 million classification decisions annually, thereby creating an enormous stock of classified documents.

The Reagan administration sharpened the conflict by relaxing regulations requiring periodic review of classified documents for declassification. By 1985, classification decisions had reached an annual rate of 15 million, endangering the open government envisioned by the Founding Fathers.

But, with the end of the Cold War and the decline in direct threats to national security, the need for secrecy has been reduced. Many previously classified national security documents are being released and many newly created documents issued in unclassified form. By 1992 classification decisions had fallen to 6 million.

The Special Case of Intelligence

Intelligence documents, however, are a special case. Intelligence budgets are even exempt from the

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Constitutional provision requiring public accounting by government agencies. Although the intelligence agencies, like the rest of the government, are starting to question excessive secrecy, reduced threats to national security have not translated quickly into reduced protection of intelligence from public disclosure.

New standards have to be established on what to release and what to protect. New ways of thinking have to evolve to challenge the intelligence agencies' culture of secrecy. Because intelligence documents are often highly sensitive, however, care has to be taken before releasing them to the public.

During the special circumstances of World War II and the Cold War, the American people were willing to support a permanent, organized, secret intelligence effort and to delegate oversight of its performance to a limited number of members of the executive and legislative branches. Whether the public will continue to support a large intelligence effort in the more benign climate of the 1990s is by no means certain. Because the case can be made only by providing the public with information needed to judge intelligence performance, openness is a necessity. The alternative is to watch intelligence budgets shrink and return to the situation prevailing before World War II, when the intelligence effort was limited, sporadic, and largely unimportant.

Historical Review

To understand the problems associated with reducing secrecy in intelligence, it is first necessary to understand how the current system evolved. Collecting wartime intelligence was a key concern of the Founding Fathers. The Second Continental Congress set up a Committee of Secret Correspondence to oversee espionage operations and appointed Benjamin Franklin and John Jay, among others, as members. Protecting intelligence secrets got off to a bad start, however, when the Committee had to fire Thomas Paine, briefly the Committee's secretary, for leaking classified information. After the Revolutionary War, the intelligence effort lay dormant until World War II, though there were isolated bursts of activity during the Civil War, World War I, and other emergencies.

The National Security Act of 1947 and executive orders issued by administrations since then have codified experiences from World War n and the Cold War and have established a foundation in law and regulation for today's system for controlling intelligence secrets. Many of the basic concepts are drawn from the successful Anglo-American effort during World War II to prevent Germany and Japan from learning that the Allies were reading their codes. The guiding principle of this effort was to limit and control distribution of information. The lesson of concealment was evident in President Truman's 1952 decision to establish the National Security Agency but to keep secret its mission of collecting intelligence from foreign electronic signals.

The advent of high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft in 1956 and of orbiting reconnaissance satellites in 1960 created new kinds of intelligence requiring new systems of protection. These took the form of special clearances for those permitted to receive the information and special handling procedures for distributing it. Later, the National Reconnaissance Office was established to manage satellite programs, but the government did not acknowledge its existence until 1992. All these events combined to create an inward-looking culture of secrecy that is hard to change.

Current Needs for Protection

The new standards for secrecy evolving in intelligence agencies reflect the changing circumstances of the 1990s, for intelligence has to respond to the customers it serves and the new foreign policy environment. Today's foreign policy environment is less threatening to our national survival, but it also is less predictable and more complex than in the recent past. Issues are becoming transnational in scope, and coalitions rather than unilateral actors are forming to deal with them. The former Soviet Union, an intelligence target that once accounted for more than half of all intelligence spending, has been replaced by the new targets of nationalism and ethnic violence, proliferation of advanced weapons, narcotics and terrorist activities, economic security, the environment, and regional issues.

New customers for intelligence are displacing old ones as regulatory, law enforcement, and economic agencies compete with traditional customers in the White House, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense. Links to policy and military customers are becoming closer and the demand for actionable intelligence greater, putting pressure on the Cold War principle that intelligence should be closely held, highly classified, and protected from public disclosure during regulatory or law enforcement actions.

Accordingly, to determine what needs safeguarding today, the concept of protecting intelligence sources and

methods embedded in the National Security Act of 1947 has to be adjusted to fit the new policy environment and customer base. Among the sources of intelligence, at least three merit protection: clandestine agents who provide the US with needed information, technical collection systems that gather information from space or from sensors, and foreign governments, which volunteer information in confidence.

Similarly, key methods have to be protected. Among them are techniques that clandestine agents use to collect information, capabilities of technical collection systems, location and details of intelligence installations abroad, cooperative relationships with foreign intelligence services, and special analytical methodology.

The task before intelligence agencies now is to build higher fences around fewer secrets, limiting protection only to sources and methods that merit it, while disclosing as much as possible of everything else. To accomplish this, careful consideration of the gains and losses from disclosure has to replace the habit of automatic classification. The bias has to favor disclosure, and classification decisions have to be clearly justified. Only in this way will intelligence agencies be able to serve customers of the 1990s who need unclassified information for use in demarches to foreign governments, in regulatory and law enforcement actions, and in support of military forces subordinated to international organizations. And only in this way can the intelligence agencies help to reduce the confiict between open government and the requirements for secrecy.

Secrets and the 1990s

Although a good start has been made in reducing secrecy in intelligence agencies, a number of problems remain. One is assembling the large number of people needed to declassify old documents at a time when personnel budgets are shrinking. Another is finding ways to present current documents directly to the public and the press rather than indirectly under the imprimatur of other government organizations, as has usually been the case in the past.

Imaginative thinking also has to be applied to the question of deciding what old information to make available. For example, environmental scientists want daily satellite imagery of the former Soviet Union going back to 1961 because it contributes to an understanding of land use, soil mechanics, snowmelt, and climate change. Cold War historians want information on major events of the last 45 years. Intelligence archives contain information whose value to the public such experts can determine. But, even with their help, culling tens of millions of documents with limited resources is difficult.

Maintaining permanent intelligence organizations in a democratic society is still experimental. The outcome depends in part on rolling back the culture of secrecy and revealing as much information as is consistent with protecting sources and methods. Intelligence activity, formerly a requirement of the Cold War, is now an issue of new national policy. Like other such issues, it will be decided by an informed public acting through elected representatives.

One sign that progress is being made is the decision of the last two Congresses to cut intelligence budgets less than defense budgets. Another sign is that many foreign intelligence services have turned to Washington for advice on how to open their organizations to greater public scrutiny. Ideas that were first expressed in our Constitution are inspiring them to begin accounting publicly for some of their activities and funds. Although the process of reducing secrecy in American intelligence is painful and progress is slow, the goal of making government more open is worth the effort.

The Declassification Engine: What History Reveals About America's Top Secrets

Matthew Connelly (Pantheon, 2023), 540 pages, notes, index.

Reviewed by Travis D. Stolz

For more than 150 years after its founding, the United States had little reason and fewer means to classify national security information. Intelligence was synonymous with the battlefield and consisted of what Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington, called "guessing what was on the other side of the hill."[a] Absence of war meant no need for intelligence collection. That all changed with the attack on Pearl Harbor. According to Matthew Connelly, author of *The Declassification Engine*, the dark state "was conceived on December 7, 1941" and "could be seen as a precedent, and a premonition" of the murky tale he tells. (36, 44)

Connelly is a professor of international and global history at Columbia University and principal investigator at History Lab, a National Science Foundation-funded project to apply data science to the problem of preserving the public record and accelerating its release. In *The Declassification Engine*, Connelly has two theses: using machine learning tools is the key in dealing with the vast amount of classified information; and the cause of this ocean of data the dark state.

This dark state, Connelly explains, is not a "deep state" of unelected bureaucrats defying elected leaders. Rather, the dark state "goes all the way to the top" to presidents themselves. (6) He attempts to explain "the exponential growth in government secrecy," so that "citizens can hold government officials accountable" and "learn from those actions so the government could make better decisions in the first place." (ix, xii–xiii)

The amount of classified information and declassification methodology has bedeviled US Government officials for decades. The rise of the United States as the sole nuclear superpower after World War II undoubtedly raised the stakes for national security. Moreover, the growth of increasingly sophisticated collection techniques led to the need for commensurate levels of protection. Since 2014, Connelly and the History Lab have been developing "a platform that combines big data, high-performance computing, and sophisticated algorithms to reveal what the government did not want us to know, and why they did not want us to know it." (xvi) Connelly reviewed hundreds of thousands of declassified records—largely redacted volumes of *The Foreign Relations of the United States* from 1932–80—to see what they might reveal. (253) If these methods could be applied wholesale to the breadth of official classified information, Connelly would go a long way in taming the classified information beast.

Connelly presents not only the rise of the volume, variety, and velocity of classified information, but the national security apparatus after World War II. It is this latter point where Connelly focuses most of his attention, because he argues that the fundamental problem is neither the amount of classified information nor how many people have security clearances. Instead, it is the dark state itself. Immediately after the war, Connelly writes, "[r]ather than forming part of a strategy for national security, secrecy was used and abused to justify spending more on weapons, which was already becoming an end in itself." (135)

While Connelly provides a helpful resource for tracing the history of executive orders on classification (284–315) and the rise of sensitive compartmented information in his chapter on the Manhattan Project (60–96), his reading of the history of classification is flawed. Connelly fails to appreciate nuance and the frightening realities of the post-war period, when questions like "What is the purpose of intelligence?" or "What should intelligence support?" had no immediate answers. Is intelligence simply seeing what's on the other side of the hill? Or are we well beyond battlefield concerns? Instead, Connelly sees this simply as a power grab for the dark state. There is a pattern to Connelly's work: as soon as a crisis emerges, the looming dark state is there to take advantage and probably engineered the crisis in the first place.

a. Philip Haythornwaite, Wellington: The Iron Duke (Potomac Books, 2007), 97.

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The book's dénouement is anticlimactic. After indicting the dark state, Connelly warns of "the end of history" following his presentation of his research to various agencies—including CIA and the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity—that proved unsuccessful. (387) Connelly describes his meeting with Catherine Cotell, IARPA's deputy director for research, in underwhelming terms: "Cotell showed us to the door, and out to the parking lot. The sun had set, and it was dark outside. I looked around at the classified government-funded labs, and realized that the public might never know what they were doing in secret, or why they were doing it." (386)

So what does history reveal about America's top secrets? The dark state's desire for power "is the core, the spinning core, of the dark state." (318) Notwithstanding Connelly's focus on the use of machine learning to build declassification efficiencies and accuracy, his thesis that power is the irreducible causal factor and the answer to every question he poses is flawed. As a result, *The Declassification Engine* demonstrates less an historical assessment based on sources and far more Connelly's attitude toward official secrecy.

The reviewer: Travis D. Stolz is an analyst in CIA's Directorate of Analysis with extensive experience in classification review.

Communicating with Intelligence: Writing and Briefing for National Security (3rd edition)

M. Patrick Hendrix and James S. Major (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2022), 310 pages, appendix.

Reviewed by Michael J. Ard

Communicating with Intelligence fulfills a basic need in intelligence studies by providing a comprehensive and common-sense guide for the aspiring or apprentice intelligence analyst. The first two editions by James Major covered just about every aspect of issues of writing and briefing intelligence products. I am aware of no other book that does as thorough a job.

M. Patrick Hendrix of The Citadel Military College has ably updated this third edition, making the current volume about one hundred pages shorter than the second edition by consolidating a few chapters and eliminating some add-on material. The new book is leaner but no less substantive.

Some educators might prefer the longer version, with its appendices on style and better word choices, and I do miss some of the touches of the second edition, such as Stephen King's advice to "Read a lot and write a lot." But I see virtue in the new volume's compactness. Surely the author reasoned that what's been cut, such as the citation section, probably can be found in various agencies' style guides.

The book offers good guidance to its readers, reminding them that analysis is not just about forecasting (apologies, Dr. Philip Tetlock) but also about interpreting problems and supporting decisionmakers. *Communicating with Intelligence* also highlights the important differences between academic and intelligence writing, which can be a significant hurdle for many recent graduates.

The book hammers away at the "Bottom Line Up Front" writing style, even leading off each chapter in this manner. This approach will probably be welcomed by newcomers, who need to learn how to "lead with their strongest punch." Analysts are not mystery writers, dropping clues. "Organizing your paper around questions" and "pointing your paper in one direction" sound like the advice of my first mentor in the CIA's then Directorate of Intelligence. The book also urges its reader to focus on the future and think in estimative terms. An important chapter in the book, carried over from the previous editions, gives advice on "prewriting"—drafting without worrying about perfection—which will help many junior analysts to overcome the real problem of writer's block.

To illustrate its themes, the new edition makes excellent use of declassified intelligence products, especially excerpts from the 2007 Iran nuclear weapons program National Intelligence Estimate and other declassified products. These work well for new analysts who have had little exposure to what finished intelligence looks like. Reflecting current anxieties, the new book highlights a joint intelligence bulletin on lethal domestic extremism.

The new edition of *Communicating with Intelligence* offers a short chapter on structured analytic techniques (SATs). It is interesting that the original author James Major ignored these thinking tools in his earlier editions. The new inclusion reflects the recent educational and US Intelligence Community trend in encouraging SATs to produce analysis. The chapter highlights common techniques such as brainstorming, indicators and warning, devil's advocacy—the later technique all but obsolete these days—and analysis of competing hypotheses. More esoteric methods can be explored on one's own. In this reviewer's opinion, it might be appropriate, especially for junior analysts, to mention some pitfalls of these techniques, especially if they are relied on too heavily for overcoming bias.

The book deals ably with new research methods, particularly the use of social media and its many hazards, such as disinformation and false accounts. The new edition could make more mention on the legal statutes and rules governing the monitoring of social media accounts by government agencies. Future editions doubtless will focus more on the role of artificial intelligence in conducting intelligence research.

Given that *Communicating for Intelligence* aims at the writing process, it might have benefited from a chapter on how to work with peer feedback, and importantly, how to work with editors. Intelligence analysts, wherever they are, are writing for a bureaucracy with an emphasis on

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consensus, and they must know how navigate through an often lengthy review process while preserving the main analytic message.

The book retains its former valuable section on briefing skills. The only thought I offer is that what often works in briefing civilian policymakers (focus on the bottom line) might fail for other military or commercial audiences, who demand greater detail. Likewise, learning how to read a room—and how to cut material on the fly—is an essential skill that probably only comes with harsh experience.

In closing, the book includes in its appendix a memo written in 1983 by CIA Director William Casey's adviser Herb Meyer on "Why is the World So Dangerous?" I'm glad the author decided to include this essay in alternative analysis. New analysts need to grasp the message that, 40 years ago, the intelligence community also confronted daunting challenges, but as Meyer noted, our Soviet adversaries had their own problems too, and that their fortunes could change quickly. A good message for these uncertain times.

The reviewer: Michael J. Ard is a former CIA officer and a professor at Johns Hopkins University, where he directs the master's of science in intelligence analysis program.

Hacker, Influencer, Faker, Spy: Intelligence Agencies in the Digital Age

Robert Dover (C. Hurst & Co. Publishers Ltd., 2022), 342 pages, notes, index.

Reviewed by Graham Alexander

Professor and author Robert Dover's *Hacker, Influencer, Faker, Spy: Intelligence Agencies in the Digital Age* seeks to frame itself as a meditation on intelligence work in the digital age. Dover's analysis is broken into 10 chapters that review aspects of how enhanced technological capabilities have changed the landscape with ever-increasing speed. He argues that these capabilities will have serious implications on culture, security, and public perceptions of both intelligence agencies and the governments that administer them. Dover's prose is vintage ivory tower: lecture-hall style, he bounces across a range of topics with no obvious connection, often using unnecessarily complex terminology.

Dover also occasionally commits factual errors or uses terms such as the "Global North," whose meaning is unclear. In a manner reminiscent of Hegel, however, incisive and thought-provoking commentary occasionally shines through cracks in the clouds. The result is that *Hacker, Influencer, Faker, Spy* proves a worthy read for intelligence professionals and policymakers with the diligence and curiosity to plow through its contradictions and often winding prose.

Dover has obviously read and thought extensively on intelligence but his writing is often unnecessarily complex or imprecise. He writes in one 38-word sentence, for example, "It is the process of intelligence that has historically led to the presence of monocultures, and the way in which the security imperative has led to reinforcing patterns of recruitment, in varying intensities across often highly distinct organizations." (62)

At other points, he seems confused on terminology or unfamiliar with established facts. He references Kim Philby on several occasions, for example, calling him an "infamous double agent" when Philby was always a Soviet penetration of British intelligence. (179) He claims later that Richard Grenell was President Donald Trump's final director of national intelligence; it was John Ratcliffe. (196) Other claims are less obviously false but still dubious. At one point, Dover argues that most Hollywood studios depicted the "global war on terror" as a clash of civilizations and that this allowed the Bush administration to push more aggressively for antiterror legislation. (243)

Dover's work clearly would have benefited from better editing. Dismissing it altogether, however, constitutes a bridge too far. Indeed, Dover's distance from the intelligence trade allows him to avoid undue focus on tactical concerns. He instead ponders wider societal, cultural, and technological trends borne from big data and the concomitant growth of collection capabilities. Dover is uncomfortably credible when discussing how various events such as the Iraq wars have soured public perception of experts and widened the perceived gulf between ruling elites and the ruled. (49) In a separate passage, Dover hits another bullseye when he urges more reflection on the possibility that the same enhanced intelligence capabilities that many citizens support against accepted enemies are available for use against less obviously antithetical political ideologies. (269) "The promise of the liberalization of official information has not been realized in practice," Dover writes, "and the ability to monitor and counter those investigating government activities has increased." (183)

Dover concludes humbly that there is "a better way for intelligence—but no obvious pathway to it." (314) The conclusion may be anodyne but it is nevertheless appropriate. For all its faults, *Hacker, Influencer, Faker, Spy* is a worthy piece of intelligence literature for those already versed in the genre. This is not because it provides answers, but because it invites readers to think about how intelligence agencies in the West must adapt and work within the rule of law during an age of rapid technological change. (For Hayden Peake's perspective on this book, go to Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf, beginning on page 67.)

The reviewer: Graham Alexander is the pen name of a CIA officer in CSI's Lessons Learned Program.

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Assignment China: An Oral History of American Journalists in the People's Republic

Mike Chinoy, (Columbia University Press, 2023), 479 pages (paperback), photographs, notes, index.

Reviewed by Stephen C. Mercado

For much of the Cold War, American journalists covered the People's Republic of China from the British colony of Hong Kong, largely relying on radio broadcasts, refugee interviews, and the US Consulate for clues to the opaque developments taking place in China's distant capital. After President Nixon's dramatic 1972 visit to China and subsequent establishment of bilateral relations, US reporters opened bureaus in Beijing and Shanghai. They then directly gathered information, interviewing officials and speaking to ordinary people. Reporters also exploited successive technical advances to gather information. In addition to radio, the journalists over time turned to television, the internet—including Chinese Weibo microblogs and Baidu's search engine—and tools like Google Earth. In recent years, however, changes in PRC domestic politics and deteriorating relations between Beijing and Washington have resulted in an increasingly difficult environment for foreign media. Some US journalists, barred or deterred from working in Beijing, are now covering PRC developments from Seoul or Taipei.[a]

Veteran CNN Asia correspondent Mike Chinoy, now affiliated with the US-China Institute (USCI) at the University of Southern California, has produced an oral history of American journalists covering the China beat. The book follows USCI's video series *Assignment: China*, which Chinoy helped create. This collective history of American reporters in China ranges from World War II to 2021.[b]

In format, the book resembles Studs Terkel's 1974 bestseller, *Working*, which was an examination through a collection of oral histories of the meaning of work in the United States. Where Terkel quoted Americans who worked in various occupations, with their stories grouped around themes, Chinoy puts his collected statements from US reporters in chronological order. The resulting history has both cyclical and linear aspects. As with the rise and fall of Chinese dynasties, the overall shape of this history is cyclical: US reporters both early in the book's history and at its end cover a restrictive PRC from abroad. At the same time, the history shows a linear progression in the increasingly sophisticated tools of the reporter's trade, from transcripts of PRC radio broadcasts to global mapping software.

When the Chinese Communists in 1949 drove the Nationalists from the mainland and proclaimed the establishment of the PRC, US journalists also withdrew from and lost direct access to China. When Beijing's initial hostility abated, with Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai in 1955 offering US journalists the chance to open bureaus in the capital, the State Department intimidated reporters with fines and jail. As John Roderick of the Associated Press recalled, the threatened fines of $10,000 and jail terms of five years "damped everything." (22) US reporters thus worked for decades in Hong Kong, across the border from Guangdong Province. *Time* magazine's Stanley Karnow, an early China-watcher in the then British colony, observed, "Here you are sitting in Hong Kong, covering these vast places, like sitting in Bermuda covering the United States." (25)

Open sources proved to be essential in Hong Kong. The *Washington Star*'s Henry Bradsher recalled: "There were two primary tools. One was Xinhua She, the New China News Agency. Second was transcripts of Chinese radio broadcasts, which were jointly done by the BBC and the US Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). A serious job of China watching required going through that material every day, not only seeing what was being said, but what was not being said." (27) Also monitoring radio and other Chinese open sources

a. In 2022, the worsening environment for journalists in China led the Foreign Correspondents Club of China (FCCC) to publish a condemnatory review of Beijing's restrictive measures in the previous year. See "2021: Locked Down or Kicked Out Covering China," accessible at https://fccchina.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/2021-FCCC-final.pdf?x39796. Hong Kong, which reverted to PRC control in 1997, is no longer a secure vantage point for China watchers.

b. For an earlier history of American reporters in China, extending from the start of the 20th century to 1949, see Peter Rand, *China Hands: The Adventures and Ordeals of the American Journalists Who Joined Forces with the Great Chinese Revolution* (Simon & Schuster, 1995).

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was a Hungarian Jesuit priest, Fr. Lazlo Ladany, whom *Newsweek*'s Robert Elegant described as "a great, great China watcher." His weekly *China News Analysis* newsletter, in the words of the State Department's Nicholas Platt, "matched in intensity and depth the analysis of staff that were ten to fifteen times the size." (28)

Human intelligence also yielded insights. Unable to enter China, US journalists interviewed refugees who made their way to Hong Kong. Refugees, however, tended to be deceitful and manipulative. When telling the truth, they generally knew little that had taken place beyond their own communities. As Robert Keatley of the *Wall Street Journal* put it, the interviewing of refugees "wasn't a main source. It was good for anecdotes and quotes." (29)

Perhaps more useful were the information and insights gained in give-and-take with diplomats, intelligence officers, and local staff of the US Consulate.[a] Joseph Lelyveld of the *New York Times* recalled fondly his twice-weekly sessions of tea reading at the Clipper Lounge of the Mandarin Hotel with consulate employee Vincent Lo, "a very brilliant analyst" who possessed an encyclopedic knowledge of China.

In reading these recollections, this reviewer found striking the similarities between journalists and intelligence officers. In their work, journalists on the China beat combined the roles of intelligence collector, reports officer, and analyst. While working largely in open sources, they gathered information from various streams of intelligence. The AP's John Roderick, resident in Yan'an in World War II, had direct and frequent access to Mao Zedong and other Communist leaders. (11) Josh Chin of the *Wall Street Journal* and two colleagues worked with a commercial satellite imagery company and a Canadian law student to exploit Google Earth in charting in 2018 the establishment and growth of reeducation camps for Chinese Uighurs. (400) Bloomberg's Michael Forsythe and David Barboza of the *New York Times* built their reports on the private fortunes of PRC leaders in published records of China's State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) and other open sources. (353, 355)

Counterintelligence was also a concern. Once US journalists started working in mainland China, they took various measures to evade government surveillance and protect their sources and information as they went about Beijing and ventured into such sensitive and remote areas as Tibet and Xinjiang. Lisa Lim of National Public Radio (NPR) recalled how, as wary Chinese authorities increased surveillance in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings, US journalists began incorporating into their news gathering "a real element of tradecraft, almost in the spy way," with such practices as flying into a province adjacent to the final destination, hiring a car to drive into the target province, then switching to a second car with local license plates. They also avoided staying at hotels. (333)

Journalists would remove incriminating USB thumbdrives from their electronic devices and replace them with ones storing innocuous information. CNN's Rebecca MacKinnon recalled her camera operator filming a sensitive interview with the mother of a student killed in the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, replacing the tape with a second one with which to film the mother pretending to reject the interview request, hiding the first tape in the apartment for later retrieval, and then walking out the door to let Chinese security personnel confiscate the fake tape. (262–63)[b]

Having taking pains to evade surveillance, gather information, analyze it, and write reports, American reporters at times faced resistance from editors and publishers. Roy Rowan worked with *Life* colleagues to photograph and report the 1949 Communist takeover of Shanghai,

a. In late 1965, contract Chinese translators in the Hong Kong Consulate alerted US officials to the importance of the fierce attack in the *Shanghai Liberation Daily* in November 1965 on the play *Hai Rui Resigns from Office* as an important political indicator early in the Cultural Revolution. According to State Department official Nicholas Platt, the denunciation was the "opening shot" of a campaign by Madam Mao's faction against the Beijing Party Committee. (38)

b. US journalists were not alone in practicing "spycraft" in China. Japanese journalists have also resorted to similar practices. Shida Kenzo of Jiji Press, whose China assignments included serving as chief of its Beijing bureau, wrote in his memoir *Pekin tokuhain* [*Beijing Correspondent* (Heibonsha, 1999)] of his efforts to thwart Chinese surveillance by using public telephones to call sources, exiting a hired car far from his rendezvous, and walking the rest of the way. Noguchi Toshu of the newspaper *Sankei Shimbun* recalled in his memoir *Chugoku shin no kenryoku eri-to: Gun, choho chian kikan* [*China's Real Power Elite: Military and Intelligence/Security Organs*, (Shinchosha, 2012)] hiding his camera's memory card containing sensitive photographs in his socks and replacing it with a substitute showing nothing incriminating before Chinese officials intercepted him.

CNN camerawoman Cynde Strand, correspondent Mike Chinoy, and soundman Mitch Farkas, in Lhasa, Tibet, 1988. (Photo courtesy of Mike Chinoy)

showing the elite Western residents carrying on at the French Club and Nationalist soldiers in retreat throwing their uniforms into the Huangpu River and seeking civilian clothes to hide their identities. *Life* declined to publish their eyewitness account. (19) Karnow recalled covering China for the publications of Henry Luce as "a challenge" because the publishing giant, born and raised in China, was "fiercely anticommunist."[a] (30) At times, reporters contended with editors seeking only positive stories. When the pendulum swung to interest in critical coverage of human rights in China, some journalists worried that the media were failing to report the story of the nation's remarkable economic rise.

A final striking aspect of this book's history is the importance of language and area knowledge in covering China. Many reporters went on the China beat after studying Chinese and, in some cases, earning a degree in Asian studies. Henry Lieberman of the *New York Times* had studied Chinese at Columbia University before serving during World War II with the Office of War Information (OWI) in China and later returning to Asia as a journalist to cover China. *Newsweek*'s Robert Elegant acquired a master's degree at Columbia in Far Eastern studies. Orville Schell earned a doctoral degree in Chinese history from Berkeley before writing on China for the *New Yorker*. As Chinoy noted in the book's introduction, he and other US journalists studied the language, culture, and history as part of their "abiding passion" for the country at the center of their careers.

Their knowledge gave them access. *Newsweek*'s Dorinda Elliott, who had studied Chinese and earned a bachelor's degree in East Asian studies at Harvard, recalled how Chinese intellectuals and others at the forefront of change in the 1980s were open to US journalists, "especially if you spoke Chinese. They gave us a window onto what was going on." (161–2) Chinese officials, keen to keep that window shut, at times expressed a wary view of Americans with area knowledge. A Foreign Ministry official once castigated Robert Elegant for his "negative" if accurate reporting on China and berated his knowledge of the language as "too damned good!" (96)

Mike Chinoy's collection of oral histories offers fascinating accounts of US reporters covering one of journalism's key international beats over the course of close to a century. The only thing missing, in my view, is information on the Chinese employees of the US news organizations in Beijing and Shanghai. Andrew Browne of the *Wall Street Journal* described the typical "two-tiered" bureau as one with a core of Chinese assistants working for a few foreign reporters. According to Chinoy, "the Chinese assistants were indispensable windows into Chinese society and, at many news organizations, were acting as reporters in all but name. Critical in developing story ideas, finding interviewees, translation, and research, the assistants were heavily involved in almost every aspect of coverage." (287)

It would have been fascinating to read their accounts of working in US news bureaus after the Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Service Bureau placed them there. I particularly wish that Chinoy had addressed the intelligence threat to reporters who employed PRC nationals assigned to them by the DSB. *Sankei Shimbun*'s Beijing Bureau correspondent Noguchi Toshu would tell the many

a. Luce's publications included the magazines *Time*, *Life*, and *Fortune*.

visiting Japanese who queried him on possible spying by local staff that one had to work while keeping that possibility in mind. To protect his sources, for example, Noguchi never used his bureau's Chinese drivers when meeting a source whom he wished to protect. (*Chugoku shin no kenryoku eri-to,* 39–40) Still, given the sensitivity of their status as PRC citizens working for US journalists, it is understandable that Chinoy decided against interviewing them.

This is a book for anyone interested in China or journalism.

The reviewer: Stephen C. Mercado is a retired Open Source Enterprise officer.

A Question of Standing: The History of the CIA

Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (Oxford University Press, 2022), 300 pages, endnotes, bibliography, index.

Reviewed by Brent Geary

Scottish historian Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones has, over a long career, written a series of books about CIA and US intelligence. His first, *CIA and American Democracy* (1989), accomplished much as a scholarly, well-researched look into the history of the agency through the late 1980s. In the words of reviewer Robert Sinclair, writing for this journal, it was "a worthy book, a serious book, an earnest book."[a] It was also, according to Sinclair, "a flawed book that leaves the reader frustrated and unsatisfied." Jeffreys-Jones's most recent offering, *A Question of Standing: The History of the CIA*, appears formed by a similar mold. It is at times insightful, critical but largely fair, and well-sourced. However, the author's frequent digressions, sensational flourishes, limited scope, and often unsupported conclusions make this an uneven and mostly disappointing book.

First, it is important to stress that Jeffreys-Jones remains a serious student of US intelligence who recognizes its importance and tries to give praise where he thinks it due. Unlike some writers about CIA—journalist Tim Weiner and his *Legacy of Ashes* (2007) comes to mind—Jeffreys-Jones appears not to have set out to condemn CIA but to offer an honest appraisal of its strengths, faults, and place in the world. While critical of their failures, for example, he generally credits CIA analysts with serving honorably and well. He lauds the way CIA has adapted to congressional oversight, calling it "a model for other nations," and argues that "With regard to China and Russia … not many citizens of democratic nations would wish the CIA not to exist." (220) He also displays a keen eye for the unique challenges of conducting intelligence operations in an open, democratic society, stressing several times that it is often policymakers, rather than intelligence practitioners, who deserve the lion's share of the blame for some of the more noteworthy "intelligence failures" in recent history.

Since the publication of *CIA and American Democracy*, Jeffreys-Jones has stressed the importance of the agency's "standing"—its reputation and influence—with US presidents, Congress, and the American people, a theme supposedly so central to his latest book that he incorporated it into its title. While certainly a point worth making and studying at length, and despite the author calling it his central thesis, his treatment of the topic is sporadic at best. For every good reference to how a president or the public viewed the agency at a given time—and there are several—there are long stretches in this book where the importance of standing falls by the wayside. In addition, Jeffreys-Jones never provides a standard by which to measure CIA's standing and sometimes struggles to prove his arguments.

The book's title is misleading for another reason. By the author's own admission, it is not really a comprehensive history of CIA but a chronological series of essays on key events. (x) Many of his essays are solid examinations that deserve praise. In general, when writing about the first three decades or so of CIA history, Jeffreys-Jones is on firmer ground, mining declassified documents and secondary sources such as memoirs of former CIA leaders and officers. For example, he provides evidence that although the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was a key inspiration for CIA, its influence has been exaggerated at the expense of other early intelligence offices, like the FBI, Secret Service, and State Department's World War I intelligence shop U-1.

In early chapters Jeffreys-Jones discounts former President Truman's claim after the Bay of Pigs failure in 1961 that he had never intended to have CIA conduct covert actions. "That bit of sheer mendacity," Jeffreys-Jones writes, "conformed to standard presidential protocols of denial. The truth is that, while in a very small number of cases the CIA may have acted without the say-so of the chief executive, Truman and later incumbents of the White House routinely authorized dirty tricks." (34) This is another praiseworthy aspect of the book that is featured throughout: Jeffreys-Jones does not subscribe to the notion that CIA has ever really acted as a

a. *Studies in Intelligence* 33, no. 3 (1989).

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"rogue elephant" but has instead served at the pleasure of presidents who oftentimes misused the CIA.[a]

In describing Truman's decision to disband the OSS at the end of World War II, Jeffreys-Jones argues that Truman had a strong personal dislike for OSS Director William Donovan, which dated to their interaction in World War I, when artilleryman Truman may have directed errant cannon fire on some of Donovan's men. This is a story that is not often told; in addition to adding texture to the story of the demise of the OSS, it reflects well on the author's research. However, it is here that Jeffreys-Jones first exhibits an unfortunate tendency to choose sensational, unsupported assertions that distract the reader and call into question his analytic rigor. In this case, he claims that after World War I, Truman—who struggled mightily in his early business ventures—"could only watch with a feeling of worthless envy Donovan's heroic status and rocketing career." (23) This is pure, unsubstantiated supposition.

Other examples of the author's use of similar embellishments include a passage about National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, whom he claimed, during the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, "may have been over-acquiescent in warmongering because she was in perpetual awe of her own achievement." (158) This needless and unsupported digression was particularly unfortunate because it came in the midst of an otherwise cogent argument that the George W. Bush administration sought to shift the blame to CIA and then-Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet for the Iraq WMD failure. Likewise, future DCI and Defense Secretary Robert Gates, according to Jeffreys-Jones, "remained at heart a Boy Scout glued to the flag," who "clicked his heels in agreement whenever the White House upped the ante" in the Cold War during the Reagan administration. (109) Here again, the author succumbed to pseudo-psychology and generalization, tainting an otherwise well-supported argument that Gates had sometimes allowed his biases about the Soviet Union to cloud his analytic judgment.

In still another example, in his effort to illustrate ways in which the George W. Bush administration politicized intelligence, Jeffreys-Jones again gets carried away. "Tremendous pressure was brought to bear on the CIA's WMD unit," he wrote, "whose members knew full well that Hussein did not possess the alleged weaponry." (155) Jeffreys-Jones is wrong, however, about the last half of that sentence. Tenet and many other former CIA leaders have publicly acknowledged that the agency simply failed in its analysis on Iraq WMD. No one at CIA lied in their Iraq analysis, but Jeffreys-Jones ever-so-subtly implies here that they did. This episode neatly encapsulates the haphazard nature of *A Question of Standing*. Just a few pages after implying that CIA officers had knowingly falsified their analysis, he seemingly backtracks by including a reference to a speech Tenet gave in 2004 in which he publicly admitted that CIA "had been wrong in believing that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction." (157) It is hard to know what, exactly, Jeffreys-Jones's conclusion is in this instance.

Although the author generally applauds the efforts of CIA analysts, he essentially ignores one analytic success and badly misinterprets another from the agency's recent past. In discussing CIA's failures in assessing Iraq's WMD programs, he doesn't discuss a parallel Bush administration narrative falsely purporting the existence of a working relationship between al-Qa'ida and Saddam's regime. Tenet, former counterterrorism analyst Nada Bakos, and others have written that CIA argued strongly that bin Ladin's organization had no ties to the Iraqi government, despite the repeated public assertions of Vice President Richard Cheney and Secretary of State Colin Powell's address to the United Nations in the run-up to the invasion. In the face of relentless public posturing by war advocates, CIA got it right on Iraq and al-Qa'ida, a story Jeffreys-Jones omits entirely.

In another vignette, the author argues that following the advent of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in 2005, the new organization "forced the CIA to yield the analytical high ground" to the DNI-controlled National Intelligence Council (NIC). (163) To prove his point, he discusses at length the promotion of a non-CIA analyst—State Department intelligence officer Thomas Fingar—as the DNI's deputy director for analysis and NIC chairman and argues that it was Fingar's NIC that deserves credit for the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran's nuclear weapons program. For those who may not remember, the Iran NIE concluded that Tehran had shuttered its nuclear weapons program in 2003, a controversial assessment that drew

a. For a discussion of the CIA's acquisition of covert action authorities see Dr. Bianca Adair "The Quiet Warrior: Rear Admiral Sidney Souers and the Emergence of CIA's Covert Action Authority" in *Studies in Intelligence* 65, no. 2 (June 2021).

furious denunciations from conservatives who claimed that the paper's authors intended to undermine the Bush White House, details which the author includes. Fifteen years later, Iran still has no known nuclear weapons, and Jeffreys-Jones credits the NIE with having eased tensions and hawkish calls for attacks on Iran. In his quest to show that Fingar's rise somehow took place at CIA's expense, however, the author missed something important. The two lead authors of the 2007 NIE were, in fact, CIA analysts, whose meticulous work convinced skeptics across the IC to make a bold and seemingly accurate call. Perhaps not surprisingly, Jeffreys-Jones concludes that chapter by stressing that "care should be given not to exaggerate the marginalization of the CIA," and quotes former NIC Chairman Gregory Treverton as saying "we still looked to the CIA as our primary source of analysis." (171) In a pattern that is all-too-frequent in *A Question of Standing*, the author spends pages making an argument about the relative standing of the CIA at a certain time, only to undermine his point shortly thereafter.

To be fair, Jeffreys-Jones—like all intelligence historians—has a great disadvantage when writing about the recent past because they are forced to rely so heavily on journalistic accounts and interviews with former intelligence professionals, often leading them to draw conclusions based on incomplete information. Some errors in *A Question of Standing*, however, are hard to excuse. For example, the author confuses the 1976 Entebbe raid by Israeli commandos with the events surrounding the hijacking of TWA 847 in 1985 and implies—mistakenly—that forces from the US Joint Special Operations Command participated, a blunder so eminently discoverable that it leads this reviewer to judge that the book's editors and fact-checkers were also falling down on the job. (170)

Jeffreys-Jones spends the large majority of his time on three issues: intelligence analysis, CIA leadership and its working relations with policymakers, and covert action. He dabbles lightly in the CIA's development of overhead collection platforms such as the U-2—and acknowledges that they were wildly successful endeavors that helped US presidents make decisions based on solid evidence. (61) He also hits other highpoints such as the hunt for Usama bin Ladin and the 2011 operation that led to his death but breaks no new ground in these areas. His observations about CIA analysis and the ties between CIA leaders and the White House are likewise orthodox, adhering closely to conventional wisdom in most respects.

However, Jeffreys-Jones largely ignores the topic of human intelligence and the CIA's successes over the years in recruiting and handling valuable agents abroad. For example, Oleg Penkovsky—the joint British-US mole inside Soviet military intelligence whom one writer dubbed "the spy who saved the world" because of his role in the Cuban Missile Crisis—receives mention in exactly one sentence. (70) Likewise the Soviet aeronautics engineer Adolf Tolkachev—whom biographer David Hoffman called "the billion dollar spy" because of the value of his information to the US defense industry (and taxpayers)—gets only one brief mention by Jeffreys-Jones among a list of agents whom CIA turncoat Aldrich Ames betrayed to the USSR. (132) Polish agent Ryszard Kuklinski—who provided CIA with valuable intelligence about Warsaw Pact countries during the later years of the Cold War—is also barely mentioned.

Jeffreys-Jones argues throughout the book that covert action has been, in many ways, the greatest detriment to the agency's standing both at home and, especially, abroad. Again, this is not a controversial statement but neither is it particularly insightful. Another point the author stresses at various points is that no CIA director has ever resigned in protest of US policy. In fact, it is somewhat odd the degree to which Jeffreys-Jones pulls at this string. Even as he acknowledges, DCI John McCone resigned in 1965 because he had lost access to President Johnson over disagreements about the situation in Vietnam, he claims that this was not really "in protest" of policy but because McCone had lost personal standing with LBJ. (222)

It is telling, in a strange way, that Jeffreys-Jones spends nearly a third of his concluding chapter on this point because it highlights how, in spite of his vast knowledge of US intelligence history, he still misunderstands certain nuances of American government. First, it is not really a feature of US politics for senior officials to resign in protest to the degree that it is in other countries such as the author's own United Kingdom. To paraphrase Colin Powell, rightly or wrongly most officials here reason that they can do more good inside the tent than outside of it. Second, Jeffreys-Jones claims that by not resigning when faced with policies with which analysts disagree, CIA directors have allowed the agency to become "politicized"

by default. He does not contemplate that if agency leaders made a habit of such resignations, it could open CIA to the exact same charge of politicization and undermine its "standing" with future presidents likely to see it as just another self-centered bureaucracy rather than—on its best days—an objective provider of hard truths.

In sum, this book is disappointing mostly because it comes close to being much more. It is filled with details about a variety of important episodes in CIA history, and Jeffreys-Jones is clearly seeking to treat the agency fairly, from his perspective. For experts of US intelligence history and most intelligence professionals, *A Question of Standing* is probably not worth their time. For those who will read only one book about the 75-year history of CIA, however, it is probably the most complete and balanced volume currently available and could serve as a good starting point for further inquiry.

The reviewer: Brent Geary is a member of CIA's History Staff.

Hitler's Nest of Vipers: The Rise of the Abwehr

Nigel West (Frontline Books, 2022), 327 pages, notes, photographs, appendices, index.

Reviewed by Graham Alexander

Jacket notes for Nigel West's *Hitler's Nest of Vipers: The Rise of the Abwehr* promise a sweeping reappraisal of the much-maligned Nazi-era intelligence organization. They claim West's work comprises "the most detailed review of Axis intelligence operations yet published." It quickly becomes clear to the reader, however, that these statements are irrelevant to the book in hand. *Hitler's Nest of Vipers* is, instead, a sometimes excruciatingly dry summation of Abwehr operations in several geographic theaters culled mainly from British intelligence memoranda, from which West often quotes at page-spanning lengths of stilted, highly bureaucratic prose. Far from prompting a reassessment of the Abwehr's lowly reputation, the book demonstrates just how thoroughly the British and Americans penetrated and blunted its operations well before the end of World War II. A better, more appropriate advertisement for *Hitler's Nest of Vipers* would have been to label it a quasi-reference volume on Abwehr operations, assets, and personnel relevant only to seasoned intelligence scholars of the era.

West's organization of the often esoteric content makes the book feel more akin to an encyclopedia than a narrative. He focuses on Abwehr personnel and assets across various theaters where the Abwehr was active, notably omitting the Eastern Front. Simultaneously, abbreviations, era-relevant jargon, names, and cryptonyms pepper the reader with the ferocity of a rainstorm on a tin roof; the abbreviations and *dramatis personae* sections mercifully listed at the beginning of this standard-length work run a full 20 pages. Abwehr leader Wilhelm Canaris's visage graces the cover but West makes little mention of his actual work or plans for the organization.

Whatever the title, there is also next to no mention of how the Abwehr was active in planning to depose or assassinate Adolf Hitler. There are occasional instances of recruitments and tactical success but these are far outweighed by the Abwehr's shortcomings. "During the critical 'invasion summer' of 1940," West writes, "the Abwehr possessed only three sources in England, and all were run by MI5." (66) One year later, he quotes British documents showing that they had identified every Abwehr agent on 38 Spanish ships and remarks, "In counter-intelligence terms, it is hard to imagine a more comprehensive coverage of an adversary's espionage system." (174)

Under the leadership of Adm. Wilhelm Canaris (1933–44), German military intelligence was generally ineffectual and often bested by Allied counterintelligence. Canaris was hanged on April 9, 1945, for plotting against Hitler. (Photo: Wikimedia)

West typically avoids any in-depth discussion on the Abwehr's genuine intelligence production and the impact, if any, it had on German policymakers. Late in the volume, however, he stumbles unexpectedly onto analysis that could, and probably should, have been the basis for his book. German intelligence, West argues, was disadvantaged by shifting demands created from the speed of military developments. Long-distance radio transmitters were not effective means for communication and, besides, German commanders were not used to placing faith in

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

predictive intelligence. The German approach, one deeply ingrained in its military and political decision makers, was to learn the adversary's order of battle and attack. The seeming effectiveness of this approach during the first years of the war reinforced this belief and further prejudiced its leaders against Abwehr reporting. (209)

This reluctance to integrate human intelligence into decisionmaking left the Abwehr with only the most marginal of roles for affecting the outcome, whether for better or worse. Understanding its consequences, however, helps to contextualize its ineffective collection, poor vetting methods, and blunt-force approach to recruiting assets. Admittedly, this framing of the Abwehr's failure as the product of a larger political and military culture will not resuscitate its checkered reputation. It may, however, provide the premise for the kind of reappraisal that *Hitler's Nest of Vipers* promises but ultimately fails to deliver.

The reviewer: Graham Alexander is the pen name of a CIA officer in CSI's Lessons Learned Program.

Further Reviews

The Abwehr is a seemingly bottomless pit to be mined by intelligence and military historians, and it has made many appearances in articles and reviews in *Studies in Intelligence*, among them:

David A. Foy, review of *Secret Operations of World War II*, by Alexander Stillwell (63, no. 1, March 2019)

Hayden Peake, review of *Double Agent Victoire: Mathilde Carré and the Interallié Network*, by David Tremain (62, no. 4, December 2018)

Hayden Peake, review of *Hitler's Spy Against Churchill: The Spy Who Died Out in the Cold*, by Jan-Willem van der Braak (63, no. 4, December 2022)

David A. Welker, review of *The Nazi Spy Ring in America: Hitler's Agents, the FBI, and the Case That Stirred the Nation*, by Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (65, no. 2, June 2021)

Nigl West, review of *The Secret War: Spies, Codes and Guerillas*, 1939–1945, by Max Hastings (60, no. 1, March 2016)

Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf—June 2023

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake

Current Issues

The American Surveillance State: How the U.S. Spies on Dissent, by David H. Price

Hacker, Influencer, Faker, Spy: Intelligence Agencies in the Digital Age, by Robert Dover

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The Dirty Tricks Department: Stanley Lovell, the OSS, and the Masterminds of World War II Secret Warfare, by John Lisle

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Mission France: The True Story of the Women of SOE, by Kate Vigurs

Secret Alliances: Special Operations and Intelligence in Norway 1940–1945 — The British Perspective, by Tony Insall

Unbreakable: The Spies Who Cracked the Nazis Secret Code, by Rebecca E. F. Barone

Biography/Memoir

The Kneeling Man: My Father's Life as a Black Spy Who Witnessed the Assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., by Leta McCollough Seletzky

Six Car Lengths Behind an Elephant: Undercover & Overwhelmed as a CIA Wife and Mother, by Lillian McCloy

Fiction

A Spy Among Friends (TV Series)

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Current Issues

The American Surveillance State: How the U.S. Spies on Dissent, by David H. Price (Pluto Press, 2022) 353 pages, endnotes, bibliography, index.

After publishing his book *Anthropological Intelligence*,[a] which examined the contributions of anthropologists to the OSS, OWI, and the FBI during WWII, anthropologist David Price began studying their interactions with intelligence agencies during the Cold War. *The American Surveillance State* presents some results of his investigations.

Price recognizes that state surveillance is not new and in a historical review acknowledges the Soviet Union and East Germany set the gold standard while barely mentioning China. But it is the United States on which he focuses as the strong contemporary threat with its principal intelligence agencies the FBI, NSA, and CIA, subjecting civilians in general and anthropologists in particular to "unthinkable levels of surveillance." The reasons for such scrutiny, he explains, lie in the "political economic structures within the American capitalist-military-industrial economy that nurtures and profits from these limitations to freedom." (viii)

The dominant role in *The American Surveillance State* goes to "Hoover's FBI, and the abusive history of surveillance that he [sic] spawned as an inevitable development of twentieth century capitalism…a system devoted to protecting the inherent inequalities of Capital and the American political economic system." (9–10) In support of this view Price quotes CIA defector Philip Agee's comments that CIA functions as the "secret police of American capitalism." (11)

Then after a rehash of intelligence agency surveillance abuses revealed by the Church Committee and references to the Edward Snowden's NSA leaks, Prices presents a series of case studies of radical dissident—some might say far-left or fellow traveling—anthropologists describing "seven decades" of what he clearly feels is excessive, unjustified, and damaging surveillance. (290)

The American Surveillance State cautiously reflects that "some of the illegal practices of Hoover's FBI no longer routinely occur" and that "the FBI of the 1950s is not the FBI in the 2020s" though in some ways "little has changed." (291) Nevertheless, Price's overall assessments of pervasive surveillance are politically tainted, are not persuasive, and do not support his contention of the United States as a surveillance state now or in the past.

Hacker, Influencer, Faker, Spy: Intelligence Agencies in the Digital Age, by Robert Dover (Hurst & Company, 2022) 342 pages, endnotes, end of chapter references, index.

Most books with "intelligence" in their titles reveal some surprises in the story told. The surprise in *Hacker, Influencer, Faker, Spy* is that it was published. The proof is in the reading with its impenetrable prose by University of Hull professor of intelligence and national security Robert Dover. The following introductory comments illustrate the point:

> *To sit alongside intelligence officials is to quickly lose the simplicity that characterises the mission, be it avoiding surprises, or identifying, containing and rolling back threats. It is to become immersed in the self-referential maze of their operating environment: from the impenetrable jargon, through to the difficulty of forming coalitions of the willing, bureaucratic turf wars and resource conflicts to enact reforms or transformation, to the political positioning of the agencies, the individuals within them, or the very business of intelligence itself. This weight of complexity creates a fog of ambiguity for those trying to communicate what intelligence is, what it does, and how it does it. It prevents them describing what role and influence*

a. David H. Price, *Anthropological Intelligence: The Deployment and Neglect of American Anthropology in the Second World War* (Duke University Press, 2008)

intelligence has on our politics and on the individual citizen's relationship with intelligence agencies. (2)

Dover goes on to suggest what informs public understanding of intelligence:

The books, documentaries, social media feeds and other information sources that aim to improve the public's understanding of intelligence have been framed around two basic tropes: the first is a steady conservatism around the description of intelligence organisations and processes, whilst being accompanied by a drip-feed of positive and negative operational details. The second is the show-stopper revelation that generates public discussion. (3)

He cites Peter Wright's memoir *Spycatcher* as an example of the second trope before going on to assert a geographical bias to his position that he never justifies:

Intelligence activity exists to defend and advance the status quo ante. It is a tool for protecting and projecting power and it has successfully managed the politics of the Global South for at least seventy years… the vast majority of commentary about intelligence equates to retelling the partial stories of the British and American intelligence communities and that the academic and commentariat fields fail to acknowledge the aggressive centrality of the Anglosphere to the global intelligence picture: this is a reinforcing set of actors and narratives that seeks to entrench the dominance of the Global North. (3-4)

While it might be expected that the book discusses the four topics named in the title, the reality will disappoint. "Hackers" are only mentioned twice and Dover argues that "there is a persuasive school of thought that state-sponsored hackers … are engaged in the wholesale theft of private data." (285) "Influencer" appears once and "Faker" not at all. "Spy" and its various common forms are found throughout but mainly in two chapters that assert spy fiction, in its various forms, makes an "important contribution" to real-world intelligence.

Dover includes lengthy comments on modern intelligence as influenced by the internet, the potential of artificial intelligence and the prospects of quantum computers. He also discusses the importance of open sources, a concept he seems to think is new to the profession, a frequent misconception. But in general, his conclusion that "government intelligence has been disrupted by the development and widespread adoption of the internet and other networked communications" is difficult to accept from the evidence presented. (300)

Hacker, Influencer, Faker, Spy is thoroughly documented with reputable sources, but whether Dover has interpreted them properly is in doubt. (For another perspective of this book see Graham Alexander review on page 55.)

Spy Fail: Foreign Spies, Moles, Saboteurs, and the Collapse of America's Counterintelligence, by James Bamford (Twelve, 2023) 482 pages, endnotes, index.

After serving three years in the US Navy as an intelligence analyst assigned to NSA in Hawaii, James Bamford earned a JD at Suffolk University Law School, a postgraduate diploma from the British Institute of International and Comparative Law from the Sorbonne in Paris, and became a whistleblower for the Church Committee on an NSA program that involved illegally eavesdropping on US citizens. His first book, *The Puzzle Palace: A Report on NSA, America's Most Secret Intelligence Agency*, brought him threats of prosecution, journalistic awards and considerable notoriety. He would go on to write two other books on NSA. His most recent work, *Spy Fail*, as its subtitle suggests, addresses some well-known espionage-related topics, though NSA is not forgotten.

Spy Fail summarizes many US intelligence and security problems, human and technical, experienced from about 2000 to 2022. In Bamford's words, "I discovered dangerous incompetence and vast politicization," attributes that become the thematic focus of the book. (ix) Many of his examples occurred under Presidents Obama and Trump, when the country "became flooded with spies and covert operators." Others occurred in 2016 when "foreign moles went completely undetected and were able to penetrate the very highest levels of both the Trump and Clinton campaigns." Furthermore, writes Bamford, "the FBI's own counterintelligence division…was penetrated almost continuously for nearly forty years, until just recently, by both Russian and Chinese moles." *Spy Fail* offers detailed examples of other supposed penetrations by "adversaries like North Korea, and allies such as Israel and the United

Arab Emirates" that have received "little or no press coverage." Perhaps the most unsettling account states that "because of dangerous leaks at the highest levels of CIA, the United States lost its most valuable spy in Russia—Oleg Smolenkov—an agent-in-place in President Putin's Kremlin office." (x-xi, 355)

Allowing for a degree of hyperbole—if "moles went completely undetected" he would not know about them—Bamford provides lengthy discussions of problem operations. A particularly serious one concerned North Korean's acquisition of NSA's most "powerful and potentially deadly cyberweapons in history—three-quarters of their entire arsenal." (41) Bamford's complex account of how this happened involves moles in NSA, Russian cyber elements—private and government—Cyber Command, and the FBI.

Turning to Bamford's charge of "vast politicization," the key examples involve Israeli agents of influence—one a major Hollywood producer—working in support of Israel and Prime Minister Netanyahu with tacit US support. In his extensive accounts of these undertakings Bamford's pro-Palestinian views are striking.

In his introduction Bamford claims that "*Spy Fail* is the first book to take a close look at this vast breakdown of America's counterespionage system" and that the operations described have one common denominator: "They have succeeded where the U.S. counterspies and intelligence agencies have failed." But that is not quite accurate. First, at least two cases he describes, one NSA penetration and the CIA mole in Russia, were resolved. Second, other cases were dealt with, just not as rapidly as Bamford wished. Finally, Bamford does not recognize that most of the problems he identifies were not due to counterintelligence failures, but rather, were the result of personnel security issues; matters of individual trust for which there is no absolute deterrent.

Spy Fail draws on government and secondary sources and is an interesting overview. But it does not support that charge that America's counterintelligence operations collapsed.

History

The Bletchley Park Codebreakers: In Their Own Words, by Joel Greenberg (Greenhill Books, 2022) 334 pages, endnotes, photos, index.

The ULTRA Secret (1974)[a] was the first book to reveal that British codebreaking and codemaking had been conducted at Bletchley Park (BP) during WWII, but it provided few procedural or organizational details. Gordon Welchman's *The Hut Six Story*[b] (1982) was the first to do that, and many other memoirs and historical accounts have followed. SIGINT historian Joel Greenberg tells the BP story from different perspective: letters exchanged by some who served there.

Greenberg supplements the more than 100 letters reproduced with background commentary. This includes its WWI predecessor organizations, leaders, and the events that led to the location of the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS)—then its official name—at Bletchley Park.

Many of the letters—wartime and postwar—show how the men and women of BP "tested each other's reminiscences against their own." (xii) They deal with recruitment, supply, technology, personnel assignments, managerial challenges, security issues and traffic analysis. Greenberg adds important biographical and administrative detail to each subject. For example, he reports the critical comments by "Dilly" Knox, Cambridge classics scholar turned cryptographer and former member of the WWI codebreaking element Room 40, about A. G. Denniston the serving head of Bletchley Park, in a letter to "C", the head of MI6: "Neither Commander Denniston's friends, if any, expected, nor his many enemies feared, that on the outbreak of war such responsibilities should be left in hands so incapable." (xiii) Greenberg goes on to paint Denniston in a far more favorable light.

Margret Rock, a cryptographer who worked with Knox, spoke little about her BP work, but her wartime letters to her mother give a sense of day-to-day life at BP. (40) After the war she joined GCHQ and worked on Soviet ciphers.

a. Frederick W. Winterbotham, *The ULTRA Secret* (HarperCollins, 1974)

b. Gordon Welchman, *The Hut Six Story: Breaking the Enigma Codes* (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982)

Greenberg gives credit to the Polish contribution to breaking Enigma encryptions and clarifies the roles of Alan Turing and Gordon Welchman in the refinement of the Polish Bomba machines—called Bombes by the British—that sped up the decryption process.

There is also coverage of British correspondence with US and Canadian Allies. William F. Friedman, at the time the US Army chief cryptanalyst, corresponded with Denniston and Welchman during and after the war. OSS officer William Bundy exchanged letters with Welchman in 1981 concerning what turned out to be his very controversial book. (195)

An important Canadian contribution came from Benjamin Deforest "Pat" Bayly, a wartime communications expert recruited by Sir William Stephenson's MI6 station in New York. He invented a new encryption machine for teleprinter traffic, which was christened the "Rockex." (195)

The Bletchley Park Codebreakers will be of great interest to those who wonder about wartime life at Britain's best known SIGINT organization.

Covert Radio Agents 1939–1945: Signals From Behind Enemy Lines, by David Hebditch (Pen & Sword, 2021) 301 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

The cover of *Covert Radio Agents* will be familiar to CIA officers and visitors to cia.gov. It reproduces a painting at CIA Headquarters showing former CIA officer Virginia Hall operating a clandestine radio behind enemy lines for OSS during WWII. It also symbolizes the efforts of all Allied radio agents, a central theme of David Hebditch's book.

The ability to communicate with headquarters and support elements is an indispensable high-risk component of any clandestine operation. And while the function is mentioned in most books and articles on the subject, it is seldom the featured topic. *Covert Radio Agents* departs from that practice and presents examples of clandestine radio operators performing in all theaters of WWII.

Since many of the special operations were undertaken by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the OSS, Hebditch tells how the former was instrumental in training the wireless operators of the latter. Then he gives examples of their wartime contributions. Although he does not ignore those discussed in other accounts, here he includes many of the lesser knowns.

The story of French-speaking Herbert Brucker is an interesting example. Trained by both OSS and SOE, he became the wireless operator for a Jedburgh team and was dropped into France the day before the D-Day invasion on June 6, 1944. (3ff)

The need for information about occupied Norway caused the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) to recruit and train two Norwegian exiles, Atle Svardal and Dagfinn Ulriksen. Hebditch tells how they served as espionage agents and handled their own wireless communications.

The Soviets also had communication problems and Hebditch gives a detailed account of the Red Orchestra (Die Rote Kapelle) a GRU network in Europe and Switzerland. Though interesting, there is nothing new here as it is based entirely on the CIA's public report on the Rote Kapelle.

While the Allies had to develop their European resistance operations from scratch, Hebditch points out that the situation in the Pacific was different because "when war broke … Australia already had a defensive intelligence network in place" to monitor Japanese movements. Nevertheless, considerable expansion was required, especially in the Solomons—which alone comprised some 1,000 mostly unoccupied islands. Many more watchers were recruited and trained: teachers, district commissioners, fishermen. (55)

A final chapter in the book discusses the radio and other communications gear wireless operators used during the war thus completing the first account devoted to WWII *Covert Radio Agents*. A worthwhile contribution.

The Dirty Tricks Department: Stanley Lovell, the OSS, and the Masterminds of World War II Secret Warfare, by John Lisle (St. Martin’s Press, 2023) 338 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Stanley Lovell’s 1963 memoir, *Of Spies & Stratagems*, gave an account of his wartime service in charge of the OSS R&D Branch. Since few OSS records had been released at the time, the book was based solely on his memory of the operations he described. One example was the plan to inject sex hormones into Hitler’s food that would enlarge his breasts , cause his voice to become a soprano, and thus destroy his masculinity. (76) Historian John Lisle adds background and occasional new detail to this and many other stories in *The Dirty Tricks Department*.

The background material discusses the creation of OSS, the early career of its director William Donovan, and the recruitment of Lovell, whom Donovan nicknamed “Professor Moriarty” after Sherlock Holmes’s evil adversary.

Lisle explains that Lovell’s mission was to anticipate and develop special devices OSS officers and their agents might need when working against the enemy. The R&D Branch element charged with executing the mission was informally called “Division 19” and was referred to as the “Sandeman [sic] Club” because of the secrecy involved. (29)

The Dirty Tricks Department describes many of the specialty weapons and techniques Division 19 proposed. Examples include umbrella guns, single-shot fountain pens, invisible inks, forged documents, exploding dough (dubbed “Aunt Jemima”), poison pills (called “L-pills”), silent guns, disguises, and attempts to see if marijuana would serve as a truth serum—it didn’t. (204)

Lovell’s subordinates proposed some bizarre projects. The “cat bomb” operation never got off the ground, although a congressman liked the idea. Lovell himself opposed the “Bat-Bomb” suggested by an eccentric dentist but was overruled by Donovan only to suffer fatal implementation problems. (40) Perhaps the most preposterous project, Operation Fantasia, was intended to “destroy Japanese morale by exposing Japanese soldiers and civilians to the sight of *kitsune*, glowing fox-shaped spirits with magical abilities.” It was abandoned after testing in Washington’s Rock Creek Park using foxes coated with radium paint caused local panic. (87ff) One successful concept, called “Javaman,” employed remotely controlled fishing boats loaded with explosives—a kind of waterborne drone—to infiltrate enemy harbors and destroy ships. It was successfully tested but cancelled when the atomic bomb did its job. (64)

One question is likely to occur to all readers: What did the special projects created by Division 19 contribute to the war effort? Lisle’s account presents no specific operational successes. In fact, he leaves the impression that, with few exceptions, the major OSS legacy was that experienced officers that would go on to form CIA.

After the war, Lovell became a successful businessman, consulted with CIA and advocated the creation of a Division 19 element in CIA, which became the Technical Services Division (TSD). Lisle goes on at length about its director, Sidney Gottlieb and the controversial projects he undertook.

Lisle relies heavily on secondary sources, which probably accounts for two errors involving Donovan. First, Lisle refers to him as “most decorated officer in the entire U.S. military,” a distinction that belongs to Douglas MacArthur. Second, Lisle writes that before the war in Europe started, Roosevelt sent Donovan “on a series of trips to Europe to gather information on the state of international affairs and to gather rare stamps for Roosevelt’s private collection. (4) In fact, the only trip Donovan made for Roosevelt occurred in 1940.

The Dirty Tricks Department documents Lovell’s innovative ideas and Donovan’s willingness to try anything to help the war effort.

G-Man: J. Edgar Hoover and the Making of the American Century, by Beverly Gage (Yale University Press, 2022) 837 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Between 1944 and 1958, CBS Radio aired *The FBI in Peace and War*. Each episode was ostensibly based on an FBI case involving international—mostly Soviet—espionage. In an ironic touch, the series’ distinctive theme song

was a march from Sergei Prokofiev's opera *The Love for Three Oranges*. In 1965, a television series, *The FBI,* starring Efrem Zimbalist Jr. began a run that lasted until 1974. FBI director J. Edgar Hoover encouraged and exercised control over these and other media programs to convey his concept of the Bureau he headed. In *G-Man*, Yale historian Beverly Gage, presents a finely documented view of the Bureau and its notorious first director.

Born in 1895 in segregated Washington, DC, Hoover was a good student from "a loving if troubled household." (16) In high school he was a captain of cadets, a star debater and valedictorian. For family and financial reasons, he worked at the Library of Congress while attending George Washington University, where he studied law and joined Kappa Alpha, a fraternity that championed the myth of the Lost Cause. Eligible for the draft after graduation in June 1917, he found an exempted position with the Justice Department, a decision, Gage writes, that had less to do with reluctance to serve than with his situation at home.

Assigned to alien issues in the War Emergency Division during the war and to arranging for the arrest of subversives during the first Red Scare after the war, Hoover impressed management with his hard work. He secured a postwar position in the Radical Division of the Bureau of Investigation. Although initially he focused on finger print records and financial matters of potential law breakers, Gage tells of his steady progression in the more active aspects of law enforcement, counterintelligence and bureaucratic finesse. At the height of his prominence he was perceived as master of all three.

It was Hoover's attention to law enforcement matters, especially during prohibition, that resulted in the G-Man ethos. Then, early in the Roosevelt administration, he was tasked to monitor subversive activities. The experience he gained served the Bureau well, although not without controversy, in the post WWII second Red Scare era, when concerns about Soviet wartime and postwar espionage were rife.

G-Man gets mixed marks in terms of its counterintelligence coverage. Hoover's stormy relationship during the war with the British services and OSS is discussed, as is his opposition to creation of CIA after the war. There is passing reference to communist subversion during the 1930s, but no discussion of particular cases. Gage does describe how the Bureau learned of the many communist agents that were operating in the early postwar era and how some were neutralized with the help of the Venona decrypts. These included the Rosenberg network, Klaus Fuchs, Elizabeth Bentley, Kim Philby, Alger Hiss, and Harry Dexter White, to name a few. For reasons not clear, later cases that involved the Bureau, such as Yuri Nosenko and Anatoli Golitsyn, are omitted.

Domestic counterintelligence conducted under the controversial and lengthy COINTELPRO program concerned communist subversion—especially in Hollywood—the Socialist Workers Party, the KKK, the new Left, the Black Panther Party, and Martin Luther King, Jr. Gage shows how the handling of these issues diminished Hoover's reputation in some circles, though he retained nominal, but sometimes grudging, presidential support throughout his service.

G-Man does not ignore the most controversial aspect of Hoover's personality, his suspect sexuality. A lifelong bachelor, his closest personal and professional friends were men, and he made little attempt to hide the fact at work or when dining at his favorite nightspot, The Stork Club. On the other hand, in the 1950s in response to congressional hearings, dubbed the Lavender Scare, seeking to identify homosexuals in government, he initiated a program to monitor "sexual deviates." (398) Gage's treatment is balanced with the final judgment left to the reader.

J. Edgar Hoover's legacy was probably inadvertent. As Gage see it, he stayed too long, accrued too much power, and died with a tarnished reputation. A well written and documented contribution.

Mission France: The True Story of the Women of SOE, by Kate Vigurs (Yale University Press, 2021) 301 pages, endnotes, bibliography, appendices, photos, index.

In 1940 the British created the Special Operations Executive (SOE) to conduct sabotage, subversion, and related missions behind enemy lines. One Branch, F-Section, conducted operations in all of France to which it "deployed 480 agents, 39 of whom were women." (8) This groundbreaking and controversial decision was based

on the field work in France of Virginia Hall and Christine Granville. Books and articles have been written about the exploits of several of these women while others are barely known. *Mission France* is the first book to include all 39.

For convenience, British historian and author Kate Vigurs begins the book with a listing of the women agents of F Section that includes basic biographical data. The narrative discusses the always risky, sometimes heroic, roles played by these women as the war progressed. Some served as couriers, others as radio operators, and some even ran networks. Most survived but of the 16 who were arrested, imprisoned and sent to concentration camps, 13 did not return. (257)

Of these, one of the lesser known stories involved Vera Leigh, known as “Simone,” courier to the INVENTOR circuit, a sub-circuit of PROSPER. A successful business women in civilian life, she spent time in several prisons before dying at Natzweiler-Struthof with her colleagues Sonia Olschanesky and Andrée Borrel. (207)

Mission France avoids exaggeration while documenting the precedent-setting exploits of patriotic women some for the first time. A worthwhile and valuable contribution.

Secret Alliances: Special Operations and Intelligence in Norway 1940–1945 — The British Perspective, by Tony Insall (Biteback Publishing, 2019) 422 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, maps, index.

The Norwegian campaign of April–June 1940 involved the unsuccessful attempt by British land and sea forces to defend Norway against invasion by Nazi Germany. Halfway through the campaign, following growing dissatisfaction with its handling, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain was replaced by Winston Churchill, and the Norwegian government in exile was formed Britain. Since these events occurred during the evacuation of Dunkirk, the imminent fall of France, and the threat of a German invasion of Britain, the Norwegians received less support than they anticipated. Cooperation was further strained when the British did turn their attention to developing resistance operations and insisted on controlling them. By 1945, the records show that these initial differences had been overcome and, with the help of their allies, many, mostly successful, joint resistance operations had been conducted. *Secret Alliances* tells that story.

Although the topic of Norwegian resistance is not new, British historian Tony Insall has drawn on recently released files from archives in both countries that add additional detail. He discusses the role of British intelligence services involved including the Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6, SIS), the Security Service (MI5), the Government Code and Cypher School, the Special Operations Executive (SOE), and the military intelligence services. The Norwegian intelligence office (FO.II) also played an important role, as did Milorg, the military resistance movement in Norway. Even the NKVD contributed unwittingly in the form of handwritten documents from Kim Philby that provided evidence of an Abwehr agent in Norway with whom SIS was in touch throughout the German occupation.

Secret Alliances gives examples of combined operations that recovered German cypher equipment and codes. Others uncovered Norwegians the Abwehr had recruited and sent to spy in Britain. On the positive side, the Norwegian coast-watching stations provided intelligence about German naval and merchant shipping movements.

The well-known attack on the heavy water plant at Vemork (Operation GUNNERSIDE) is discussed, as is the ill-fated Operation MARTIN in March 1943, when SOE sent a team to organize and train resistance groups to attack German airfields in Norway. Another well known contribution from Norway was The Oslo report, a document sent anonymously to the British legation in Oslo in November 1939. It was forwarded to Professor R. V. Jones, the principal scientific adviser in SIS. Insall gives a good summary of its contribution.

Two American operations in Norway are mentioned. One, Operation RYPE (Norwegian for grouse) which was commanded by Maj. William Colby, was partially successful when Colby succeeded in blowing up a bridge near Tangen and then another section of the line. The second, Operation Kitten, the plan for an OSS Mission to deploy to Norway failed for bureaucratic reasons. Insall assesses the main OSS contribution as provision of prodigious quantities of weapons and equipment to the resistance.

Secret Alliances reads well, is thoroughly documented and adds substantially to knowledge of the Allies contributions to the Norwegian resistance in WWII.

Unbreakable: The Spies Who Cracked the Nazis Secret Code, by Rebecca E. F. Barone (Henry Holt, 2022) 260 pages, endnotes, bibliography, photos, no index.

Author Rebecca Barone never explains how a secret code can be cracked and be unbreakable at the same time. She does tell, without mentioning its inventor Arthur Scherbius, the well known story of the Enigma cipher machine and its role in WWII. Using entirely secondary sources, she follows the prewar contributions of the Polish cryptographers, the French counterintelligence service and its German agents with access to Enigma data, and the British role throughout war.

Unbreakable's narrative is roughly chronological, with occasional digressions into Hitler's behavior and rationale. It also tracks the counterespionage battle between Germany and France in the search for the Enigma traitor. But most importantly it deals with how the Enigma machine functions and the principal people who contributed to its success at various stages of the war. While it does not mention that other encryptions devices were used by Germany and that their output was also broken by Britain, it does provide a single source summary of Enigma's influence.

Biography/Memoir

The Kneeling Man: My Father's Life as a Black Spy Who Witnessed the Assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., by Leta McCollough Seletzky (Counterpoint, 2023) 287 pages, no index.

On Thursday, April 4, 1968, just before six in the evening, Marrell McCollough was in the courtyard of the Lorraine Motel in Memphis, Tennessee, and was the first to offer aid after hearing the fatal shot that struck Martin Luther King Jr. A photograph of the scene shows him kneeling beside the prostrate King. In *The Kneeling Man*, Marrell's daughter writes about the events that led to his presence in Memphis that day and how they affected his career in the Memphis police, the US Army, and CIA.

At the time of the shooting, 23-year-old Marrell (known as Mac to his friends) was a Memphis police officer serving undercover as member of a Black militant group called the Invaders. That he had been accepted by the police department was itself unusual. The product of a broken home with minimal education, he enlisted in the Army in 1962 and served as an MP while obtaining his GED.

After one tour, Mac returned to Memphis and became one of the first Blacks to attend the Memphis Police Training Academy. Then, following several years undercover, he became Officer McCollough, got his college degree, and worked varied assignments until informed he would never be promoted to senior positions. So Mac applied to the FBI and when he didn't get a response, he turned to CIA.

Based on conversations McCollough had with his daughter Leta, *The Kneeling Man* summarizes McCollough's CIA career in the Office of Security and the Directorate of Operations. During this period he was investigated by the FBI for involvement in the King assassination. Leta tells of the many times over the years that he discussed his role with others present. Eventually he testified on the subject before a congressional committee investigating assassinations. In 1999, by then a GS-15, he retired after being informed he would never be promoted to supergrade status.

From time to time, Seletzky describes her own background—she is a lawyer—alludes to her relationship with her father, and comments on how she decided to write the book. She characterizes CIA's culture as "clubby—white, male, Ivy League" and refers to the many instances of racial bias that affected her father's career as well as her own as she sought to collect data about him. (267)

The Kneeling Man is an impressive account of a man who began life in poverty, played a unique role in civil

rights history, overcame precedent and prejudice in the Memphis Police Department, had a remarkable CIA career, and retired with dignity.

Six Car Lengths Behind an Elephant: Undercover & Overwhelmed as a CIA Wife and Mother, by Lillian McCloy (Bordertown Publishing, 2016), 240 pages, photos, no index.

In his memoir *Night Watch*, the late David Atlee Phillips describes his early career in CIA under nonofficial cover. In her memoir, *Six Car Lengths Behind an Elephant*, the recently deceased Lillian McCloy, with the editorial help of her daughter Johanna, gives a family's view of life with a nonofficial cover officer.

After service in the Marine Corps as a fighter pilot and attaining a masters degree in political science and international relations, Frank McCloy interviewed for the Foreign Service and was told CIA was a better fit. He applied and his pregnant wife told her doctors and friends the exciting news. Fortunately, he was accepted and soon began his nearly 25 year career as an operations officer serving under nonofficial cover with the help and support of his wife and children.

Six Car Lengths Behind an Elephant is a chronological account of Frank's assignments in Spain, India, Japan and Venezuela. The book's title was taken from advice Frank gave to visitors traveling in India. In each country he worked as an executive in the local offices of an American firm while also handling CIA agents in his "off" hours. In some cases Lillian participated in his clandestine activities by entertaining agents, filling deaddrops, and translating documents.

The problems all CIA families experience during overseas assignments were amplified for the McCloys, and they varied in magnitude, depending on the country involved. Spain went well. but India was a culture shock. Even in New Delhi the "potable" water produced dysentery, which the family discovered the hard way. Everyday life became something of an ordeal due to the rampant corruption that affected every aspect of society from pro-curing safe food and transportation to the essential but sometimes unreliable security personnel.

Japan was a welcome relief compared to India. And while overcoming some marital hitches, Lillian found the language less difficult than anticipated, but she never grew accustomed to the crowding and groping on the subways. As usual the children adjusted well to the shock of different cultures as they had to the surprise of learning that their father worked for CIA.

At various points in his career, Lillian writes, Frank was challenged by a CIA superior's administrative and operational decision. In one case he opposed breaking a promise made to an agent, and his career suffered temporarily. Even after his retirement, an agency man attempted to negatively affect his new civilian job but was unsuccessful. And finally, Lillian notes several instances of bean-counter bureaucracy that resulted in refusal to pay for a car suitable for Frank's cover position and other instances of invoice denial for agent entertainment they had to absorb instead. Still, in the end, she concludes "Frank had loved working for the CIA and was proud of what he had accomplished." (238) Frank McCloy died unexpectedly, age 54, in 1986.

Six Car Lengths Behind an Elephant was endorsed by John le Carré as "A charming and unusual portrait of the secret life." He was spot on.

Fiction

A Spy Among Friends (The TV Series – 6 Episodes; Streamed on MGM+).

Based on Ben Macintyre's nonfiction book of the same name, MGM+ makes it very clear at the outset that the six part TV series is "a work of imagination." It then goes on to scatter elements of truth amid fictional characters and dialogue with no way of distinguishing between the two without prior knowledge of the case.

The series opens with Flora Soloman, a former friend of Kim Philby's, confirming to MI5 that Kim was a

communist and probably a Soviet agent. Nicholas Elliott, an MI6 friend of Philby's, is sent to Beirut to confront him and offer immunity in return for a detailed confession of all aspects of his KGB service. Philby declines and defects to Moscow. Elliott returns to London, where he is interrogated by MI5.

Enter Mrs. Thomas, a fictional character who questions Elliott about his interrogation of Philby to establish the details of the exchange. She poses questions probably asked by MI6 but not made public. For example, she wants to know if Elliott let Philby escape. She appears in each episode, some with her fictitious husband whose existence serves only to confuse.

Subsequent episodes add color to the basic story by fabricating situations and locations involving familiar figures such as Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, Anthony Blunt, James Angleton, Anatoli Golitsyn, MI5 Director-General Roger Hollis, and Jane Sissmore to name a few. One bizarre example of an event that never happened has CIA's James Angleton in London running an agent in Moscow after Philby settled there. Another has MI5 D-G Hollis personally giving Elliott, an MI6 officer, instructions at his home. On the technical side, Mrs. Thompson listens to clear recordings of Philby's Beirut interrogation, when in reality they were nearly unintelligible.

The fabrications are not the only source of viewer confusion, especially for those unfamiliar with the Philby story. The editing of episodes is atrocious! Flashbacks occur frequently and unexpectedly without identifying time, location, and in some cases participants involved.

While some may find *A Spy Among Friends* (the TV Series) entertaining, this muddled attempt to tell a famous espionage case exceeds the customary bounds of literary license and should be viewed with caution, if at all.